A Case at a Crossroad: United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis and the Intersection of Regulating Promotion of Off-Label Uses and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse by Alperowicz, Maya
 
A Case at a Crossroad: United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis and the Intersection of Regulating Promotion of Off-Label
Uses and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation A Case at a Crossroad: United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis and the Intersection of Regulating Promotion of Off-Label
Uses and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse (2004 Third Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:41:33 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8852173
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAA Case at a Crossroad:
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis
and the Intersection of Regulating Promotion of Oﬀ-Label Uses and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse
Maya Alperowicz
Class of 2004
April 2004
Paper submitted in satisfaction of course and third-year written work requirement
ABSTRACT
In United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, a former employee of a pharmaceutical
manufacturing company alleged violations of the federal False Claims Act stemming from
the company’s promotion of an FDA-approved drug for an unapproved use. The suit
presented a novel legal claim that brought together two otherwise distinct elements of food
and drug law – the regulation of promotion of oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs and the
prosecution of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse via the federal False Claims Act.
This paper examines individually each of these areas of food and drug law and then turns
to the conjunction between the two created by the lawsuit. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the potential policy ramiﬁcations of a decision in United States ex rel. Franklin
v. Parke-Davis.
I. Introduction
1On August 13, 1996, David Franklin ﬁled a nine-count action against Parke-Davis, a pharmaceutical manufac-
turing company, alleging violations of the federal False Claims Act stemming from the company’s promotion
of an FDA-approved drug for an unapproved, or oﬀ-label, use.1 Franklin’s suit presented a novel legal claim
that brought together two otherwise distinct elements of food and drug law – the regulation of promotion of
oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs and the enforcement of the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse laws via
the federal False Claims Act. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis thus provides an ideal lens for
independently examining these two elements of food and drug law, which have been the subjects of extensive
scholarly investigation. Furthermore, Franklin v. Parke-Davis creates a fascinating collision between these
two elements of food and drug law, leading to interesting legal and policy considerations.
This paper seeks to explore the two areas of food and drug law that collided in Franklin v. Parke-Davis –
regulation of oﬀ-label uses and Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse laws – as well as the conjunction of
the two. Part II of the paper details the FDA’s traditional and current approaches to regulating promotion
of oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs. Part III addresses the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse laws,
particularly the federal False Claims Act and its qui tam provision, as well as the statutory provisions of
the Medicare and Medicaid laws pertaining to prescription drug coverage. Part IV provides an in-depth
examination of the facts and legal theories involved in Franklin v. Parke-Davis, as well as a focus on those
legal questions that may prove essential in future cases based on similar claims. Finally, Part V highlights
some potential policy ramiﬁcations of a decision in Franklin v. Parke-Davis that may inﬂuence a court’s
decision in a similar future case.
II. Regulation of Promotion of Oﬀ-Label Uses of Approved Drugs
1United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (D.Mass. 2001).
2FDA’s Traditional Approach:
FDA’s traditional approach to regulating oﬀ-label use of approved drugs, which prevailed until the passing
of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, diﬀerentiated between three types of
activities – (1) oﬀ-label prescriptions by physicians, (2) marketing and promotion of oﬀ-label uses by drug
manufacturers, and (3) scientiﬁc discussion of oﬀ-label uses by third-parties. While FDA ﬂatly prohibits
manufacturers from promoting an approved drug for unapproved uses, the agency has traditionally recognized
physician prescribing habits as a component of the doctor-patient relationship, and thus has not interpreted
oﬀ-label prescriptions as violations of the FD&C Act.2 As physicians are free to prescribe approved drugs
for oﬀ-label uses, FDA acknowledges that “physicians need reliable and up-to-date information concerning
oﬀ-label uses” and that this information comes from a variety of sources.3 FDA has therefore not sought
to restrict scientiﬁc discussion of oﬀ-label uses that is truly independent from the inﬂuence of the drug
manufacturer, which is usually disseminated in the form of “enduring materials” or CME seminars.4
Oﬀ-Label Prescriptions by Physicians
“Oﬀ-label use” by physicians has been deﬁned to include using an approved drug to treat a disease that
is not indicated on its label but is closely related to an indicated disease, using an approved drug to treat
unindicated diseases, and treating the indicated disease, but varying from the indicated dosage, regimen
or patient population.5 Physician prescription of oﬀ-label uses of FDA-approved drugs is an “established
2Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 620 (2d Ed. 1991).
3Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting deposition of William K. Hubbard,
Associate Commissioner for Policy Coordination at 62-63).
4Id.
5A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug Manufacturers’ First Amendment Right to Advertise and Promote Their
Products for Oﬀ-Label Use: Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 Food & Drug L.J. 439, 440 (2003).
3aspect of the modern practice of medicine.”6 The precise extent of oﬀ-label use is not ﬁrmly established,
although some estimates state that between 25 and 65% of all prescriptions written are for an oﬀ-label use.7
Oﬀ-label use is extremely prevalent in speciﬁc areas of medicine, particularly in oncology and pediatrics.8
The General Accounting Oﬃce found that 25% of anti-cancer drugs were prescribed oﬀ-label and 56% of
cancer patients were given at least one drug oﬀ-label.9
FDA has long taken the position that, “once a [drug] product has been approved for marketing, a physician
may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens of patient populations that are not included in the
approved labeling.”10 FDA ﬁrst established this policy in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in
the Federal Register in 1972, which explained that the requirements of the FD&C Act’s new drug provisions
were satisﬁed if an approved new drug was shipped in interstate commerce with the approved package insert
and neither the shipper nor the recipient intended that it be used for an unapproved purpose.11 Once the
approved drug reached local pharmacies after interstate shipping, a physician could prescribe it for any
medical condition without considering whether FDA had determined the drug to be safe and eﬀective with
respect to that illness, and without informing or obtaining the approval of FDA.12 FDA has traditionally
taken this position because it recognizes that curtailing doctors’ ability to prescribe drugs for oﬀ-label uses
constitutes an interference with medical practice as between the physician and patient. Such interference has
6WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (citing “Oﬀ-Label Drugs, Reimbursement Policies Constrain Physicians in Their
Choice of Cancer Therapies,” GAO/PEMD-91-14 at 5 (Sept. 1991)).
7Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 440 (citing Shane M. Ward, WLF and the Two-Click Rule: The First Amendment
Iniquity of the Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Oﬀ-Label Drug Use Information on the Internet, 56 Food &
Drug L.J. 41, 45-46 (2001)).
8WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
9Id. (citing “Oﬀ-Label Drugs, Reimbursement Policies Constrain Physicians in Their Choice of Cancer Therapies,”
GAO/PEMD-91-14 at 4 (Sept. 1991)).
10Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Devices;
Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59820, 59821 (Nov. 18, 1994).
11Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503 (Aug. 15, 1972).
12Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,503; WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at
55.
4never been authorized by Congress, which declined to provide legislative restrictions on the medical profession
because of a patient’s right to seek civil damages in the courts if there is evidence of malpractice.13 FDA
therefore does not consider physicians to violate the FD&C Act by prescribing drugs for oﬀ-label uses;
however physicians may violate the Act by distributing either approved or unapproved drugs for unapproved
uses. A physician acting as a distributor of a drug is fully subject to the requirements of §505 of the FD&C
Act.14
Manufacturer Promotion of Oﬀ-Label Uses
While FDA has consistently taken the position that physicians may freely prescribe approved drugs for oﬀ-
label uses, the agency’s traditional approach to manufacturer promotion of such uses has been much more
restrictive. In its 1972 Notice, FDA stated:
where a manufacturer or his representative, or any person in the chain of distribution, does
anything that directly or indirectly suggests to the physician or to the patient that an
approved drug may properly be used for unapproved uses for which it is neither labeled
nor advertised, that action constitutes a direct violation of the Act and is punishable
accordingly... 15
FDA control of manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label use has historically come in two forms: (1) federal
regulations that explicitly prohibit manufacturers from suggesting oﬀ-label uses in any advertisement for
a prescription medical product; and (2) using manufacturer promotions as a basis for ﬁnding that the
manufacturer either placed an unapproved new drug in interstate commerce or ﬁnding that a product is
misbranded.16
13United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (M.D.Ala. 1978).
14Hutt and Merrill, supra note 2, at 622 n.8.
16Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 441.
5FDA regulations speciﬁcally state, “An advertisement for a prescription drug...shall not recommend or sug-
gest any use that is not in the labeling accepted in such approved new-drug application or supplement.”17
FDA traditionally deﬁned advertising very broadly, interpreting “the term ‘advertisement’ to include in-
formation (other than labeling) that originates from the same source as the product and that is intended
to supplement or explain the product.”18 Based on this broad deﬁnition, FDA prohibited virtually any
statement by a manufacturer “recommending or suggesting” an oﬀ-label use for one of its products.19
FDA also traditionally restricted manufacturer speech promoting oﬀ-label use through its enforcement of
non-speech related conduct regulations. This approach has come under extensive First Amendment scrutiny
in recent years, which has led the agency to modify this policy, as discussed below. However, FDA has
traditionally regulated manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses through enforcement of both the “new
drug” approval requirements and the prohibition against misbranding. FDA has taken the position that
manufacturers violate the FD&C Act by engaging in interstate commerce in an approved new drug for an
oﬀ-label use. §505(a) of the FD&C Act provides, “No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction
into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application ﬁled [with the Food and Drug
Administration]...is eﬀective with respect to such drug.”20 Armed with this statutory provision, FDA
reasoned that an approval of a new drug application for interstate distribution can only become eﬀective as
to the particular use or uses identiﬁed in the application. “Thus, an approved new drug that is marketed
for a “new use” [oﬀ-label use] becomes an unapproved new drug with respect to that use.”21
FDA has also contended that an approved new drug that is marketed for an oﬀ-label use is “misbranded”
17Prescription-drug Advertisements, 21 C.F.R. §202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2004).
18Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,076 (Dec. 3, 1997).
19Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 441.
2021 U.S.C. §355(a) (2004).
21Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286, 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000).
6under the FD&C Act because the drug’s labeling does not include “adequate directions for use,” as required
by §502(f) of the Act.22 The agency’s position has been that:
All drugs and devices must bear labeling with adequate directions for each intended use.
If labeling for a drug or device fails to contain adequate directions for each intended use,
the drug or device is deemed to be misbranded (section 502(f)(1) or the act).23
FDA has interpreted “intended use” to refer to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of the product, as shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution.24 Furthermore,
“[the] intended use or uses of a drug...may ...be determined from advertisements, promotional material,
oral statements by the product’s manufacturer or its representatives, and any other relevant source.”25
Thus, virtually any promotion of oﬀ-label use may demonstrate the existence of an “intended use” for which
instructions are not included in the product labeling, rendering the product misbranded.26
If FDA determines that a manufacturer has violated either the “new drug” approval requirements of §505(a)
of the FD&C Act or the “misbranding” prohibitions of §502(f) of the Act, it has a number of enforcement
options available under the Act. The agency may seize the approved drug, and “may seek an injunction
against, or criminal prosecution of, those responsible for introducing such a product into commerce.”27
Until recently, FDA has contended that it may use a manufacturer’s promotional speech as evidence that
a manufacturer is engaging in conduct prohibited by the FD&C Act, which may subject the manufacturer
to the Act’s enforcement provisions.28 However, as discussed below, this contention has become much more
tenuous in light of the decisions in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman and its progeny, discussed
22Id., see also Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 443.
24Id.
25Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,286.
26Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 444.
27Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,286-87 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333).
28Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 445.
7below.
Third-Party Speech Promoting Oﬀ-Label Use
In addition to allowing doctors to prescribe approved drugs for oﬀ-label uses, FDA has never sought to restrict
the ability of third-parties to publish and disseminate scientiﬁc information about oﬀ-label uses. Indeed,
as discussed above, FDA has repeatedly recognized the importance of “open dissemination of scientiﬁc and
medical information regarding these treatments.”29 FDA has, however, traditionally viewed manufacturer
dissemination of such materials as promotion that constitutes advertising and thus violates the FD&C
Act.30 FDA regulation in this area has focused on “determining whether an industry-supported activity is
independent and not generally subject to regulation,” as opposed to manufacturer-supported and therefore
regulated.31 It is in providing guidance on this issue that FDA’s policies have changed most dramatically in
recent years, particularly in response to First Amendment criticisms.
Recent Changes to FDA’s Approach:
Pre-FDAMA Guidances
For more than two decades, FDA pursued the enforcement policy discussed above regarding oﬀ-label uses of
approved drugs. FDA focused its enforcement eﬀorts on curtailing manufacturers’ ability to promote oﬀ-label
uses of their drugs, believing that the speech contained in promotional materials could properly be cabined
if it were shown to be evidence that a manufacturer either placed an unapproved new drug in interstate
commerce or that the product was misbranded. The agency did not attempt to interfere with physicians’
prescriptions of approved drugs for oﬀ-label uses, nor did it pursue actions against third parties who dis-
seminated scientiﬁc information about oﬀ-label uses, recognizing the value of such scientiﬁc information to
29WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
30Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities , 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,076.
31Id.
8the medical community. However, FDA faced a challenge because the pharmaceutical industry traditionally
played a large role in supporting the dissemination of scientiﬁc information to medical professionals through
reprints of journal articles and reference texts (“enduring materials”).32
In 1996, FDA published two Guidances entitled “Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Cer-
tain Published, Original Data” and “Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts.”33
These Guidances related to the dissemination, by drug sponsors, of reprints of journal articles and refer-
ence texts (“enduring materials”) when the publications address oﬀ-label uses for the company’s previously
approved products.34 In these Guidances, FDA noted the need to “strike the proper balance between the
need for an exchange of reliable scientiﬁc data and information within the health care community, and the
statutory requirements that prohibit companies from promoting products for unapproved uses.”35 The Guid-
ances therefore described the circumstances under which FDA intended to allow dissemination of enduring
materials to health care professionals.36
32Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities , 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,076.
33Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800, 52,800 (Oct. 8. 1996).
34WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
35Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. at 52,800.
36Id. Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data required that: (1) The principal
subject of the article be the FDA-approved use, (2) The article be published in accordance with the regular peer-review procedure
of the journal in which it was published, (3) the article should report the original study that was represented by the sponsor,
submitted to the FDA, and accepted by the agency as one of the adequate and well-controlled studies providing evidence of
eﬀectiveness, (4) The reprint should be form a bona ﬁde peer-reviewed journal, (5) If the article contains eﬀectiveness rates,
data, analyses, uses, regimens, or other information that is diﬀerent from approved labeling, the reprint should prominently state
the diﬀerence(s), with speciﬁcity, on the face of the reprint, and (6) The reprint should disclose all material facts and should not
be false or misleading. Id. at 52801. Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts required that: (1) The
reference text should not have been written, edited, excerpted, or published speciﬁcally for, or at the request of, a drug...ﬁrm,
unless the text was prepared in a manner that results in a balanced presentation of the subject matter, (2) The content of the
reference text should not have been reviewed, edited, or signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by a drug...ﬁrm, or agent thereof, unless the
text was prepared in a manner that results in a balanced presentation of the subject matter, (3) The reference text should
not be distributed only or primarily through drug...ﬁrms, (4) The reference text should not focus primarily on any particular
drug(s)...of the disseminating company, nor should it have a signiﬁcant focus on unapproved uses of the drug(s) marketed
or under investigation by the ﬁrm supporting the dissemination of the text, (5) Speciﬁc product information (other than the
approved package insert) should not be physically appended to the reference text, and (6) A drug...company representative
should not refer to, or otherwise promote, in any manner or at any time, information in the reference text that is not consistent
with the approved labeling for a product. Id. The second Guidance also provided an exception for reference texts written,
edited, or published by a sponsor or agent of a sponsor..., where the authorship, editing, and publishing of the reference text
results in a balanced presentation of the subject matter, for which FDA would allow distribution of a reference text in the
circumstances described in paragraphs 3 through 6. Id.
9Also, in the late 1980s, drug companies greatly increased the resources they devoted to sponsoring Continu-
ing Medical Education (“CME”) seminars.37 Congress became concerned with the promotional practices of
drug manufacturers, and conducted hearings in 1990 to investigate the matter.38 These hearings eventually
led FDA to publish a “Guidance for Industry on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities”
in 1997.39 This Guidance attempted to provide guidelines for distinguishing between activities on behalf of
companies that market products and activities, supported by companies, but otherwise independent from
promotional inﬂuence of the supporting company.40 The agency recognized that industry-supported activi-
ties could be both nonpromotional and educational, but noted that “demarcating the line between activities
that are performed by or on behalf of the company, and thus subject to regulation, and activities that are
essentially independent of their inﬂuence” had become more diﬃcult given industry’s increasing role in sup-
porting CME.41 FDA provided a list of twelve factors that the agency would consider as part of an overall
evaluation of “whether and to what extent the company is in a position to inﬂuence the presentation of infor-
mation related to its products or otherwise transform an ostensibly independent program into a promotional
vehicle.”42
FDAMA Changes to FDA Policy
On November 21, 1997, President Clinton signed into law the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
37WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
38Advertising, Marketing and Promotional Practices of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1990: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 2, 5, 8-13 (1990).
39WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
40Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,094.
41Id. at 64,095.
42Id. These factors included: (1) Control of Content and Selection of Presenters and Moderators; (2) Disclosures; (3)
The Focus of the Program; (4) Relationship Between Provider and Supporting Company; (5) Provider Involvement in Sales
or Marketing; (6) Provider’s Demonstrated Failure to Meet Standards; (7) Multiple Presentations; (8) Audience Selection; (9)
Opportunities for Discussion; (10) Dissemination; (11) Ancillary Promotional Activities; and (12) Complaints. Id. at 64,097-99.
10Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”), which amended the FD&C Act. The provisions of §401 of the FDAMA perpet-
uated in part and modiﬁed in part the policies contained in the FDA Guidances on enduring materials, to
permit “manufacturer distribution of written information concerning the safety, eﬀectiveness or beneﬁt of
an unapproved use of a previously approved drug under speciﬁed conditions.”43 With the passage of the
FDAMA, Congress cabined FDA’s ability to curtail dissemination of certain enduring materials concerning
oﬀ-label uses by drug manufacturers who meet the speciﬁed conditions. If a manufacturer meets the speciﬁed
conditions, FDA may not use its dissemination as evidence of the manufacturer’s intent that its product be
used for an oﬀ-label use.44 As the FDA explained, “if section 401 did not exist, the government could use
such dissemination as evidence in establishing a manufacturer’s illegal distribution of a new drug or device
for a “new use,” and in establishing that the product is misbranded.”45 The FDAMA does not address
CME seminars, thus the 1997 “Guidance for Industry on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational
Activities” still embodies the FDA’s current policy on that issue.
Under the FDAMA and the FDA’s implementing regulations, drug manufacturers may distribute particular
enduring materials, including scientiﬁc or medical studies from peer-reviewed journals or scientiﬁcally sound
“reference publications,” which is deﬁned as medical textbooks and a narrow class of other non-articles, if
they are free from inﬂuence by the product sponsor.46 Manufacturers may not distribute such enduring
materials to patients, but may distribute such information to physicians, HMOs, pharmacy beneﬁt mangers,
government bodies, and insurers, provided they meet the other requirements of the Act in doing so.47 These
requirements include:
43Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 1999); WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
44Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,287.
45Id.
46James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration § 15:14:50(2d ed. 2003); 21 U.S.C. §§360aaa-1(a), (b) (2004).
4721 U.S.C. §360aaa(a).
11(1) Any product on which a manufacturer provides enduring materials must have in eﬀect
an approved NDA, PMAA, 510(k) or biologics license;48
(2) The disseminated information must be unabridged, not false or misleading, and not
pose a signiﬁcant risk to the public health;49
(3) The information disseminated may not be derived from clinical research conducted by
another manufacturer without that manufacturer’s permission;50
(4) FDA must receive an advance copy of the information for review 60 days before the
claim is made;51
(5) The manufacturer must submit a supplemental new drug application for the oﬀ-label
use or have certiﬁed that such an application will be ﬁled within the applicable statutory
deadline;52
(6) The disseminated information must include prominent disclosure that a) the material
concerns an oﬀ-label use not approved by the FDA; b) the material is disseminated at
the manufacturer’s expense; c) identiﬁes the authors of the information who have a ﬁnan-
cial relationship to the manufacturer; d) includes the product’s current oﬃcially-approved
labeling; e) includes (if applicable) a statement that there are products that have been
approved for the particular intended use; f) identiﬁes the person providing funding for a
study of the oﬀ-label use; and g) provides a bibliography of other articles concerning the
oﬀ-label use.53
After meeting these conditions and disseminating enduring materials, the manufacturer must continue to
prepare and submit semi-annually to the FDA lists of the articles and reference publications disseminated
and the categories of recipients.54 Furthermore, FDA can force dissemination at the same time of additional
information from publications or “any information that the Secretary has authority to make available to the
public,” in order to provide an objective and balanced presentation of information on the oﬀ-label use.55
Finally, under the FDAMA, Congress limited the remedies available to FDA to stop the ﬂow of enduring
materials. FDA can only order a set of corrective materials to be submitted if it ﬁnds “signiﬁcant risk to
the public health” or can order a manufacturer to cease the dissemination of information if the Secretary
5421 U.S.C. §360aaa-2.
5521 U.S.C. §360aaa(c)(2).
12determines that the information being disseminated does not comply with the requirements of the FDAMA.56
Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman and its Progeny
In 1997, Washington Legal Foundation ﬁled suit against the Acting Commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, alleging that §401 of the
FDAMA and the three FDA guidance documents (discussed above) violated the First Amendment. This suit
led to a number of decisions by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia addressing the
compatibility of the FDA’s policies on manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses with the First Amendment.
The ﬁrst district court opinion granted Washington Legal Foundation’s motion for summary judgment,
ﬁnding that FDA’s three guidance documents, as they existed in 1997, violated the First Amendment.57
The district court subsequently issued an opinion clarifying that its opinion on summary judgment only
applied to unapproved uses of drugs approved by FDA for other purposes.58 After the FDAMA superseded
the two FDA Guidances on enduring materials, the district court reviewed its decision on summary judgment
in a subsequent opinion, Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, again ﬁnding that the FDAMA and the
FDA Guidance on CME violated the First Amendment.59 Finally, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the district court’s opinion insofar as it found the relevant provisions of the FDAMA and the CME Guidance
in violation of the First Amendment.60 After the Court of Appeals’ opinion, WLF returned to the district
court on remand and asked the court to conﬁrm and enforce its original injunction; the court declined to
do so, however, because it found that the injunction had been wholly vacated by the Court of Appeals’
opinion.61
5621 U.S.C. §360aaa-4.
57WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
58Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 36 F. Supp. 2d 418, 418 (D.D.C. 1999).
59WLF v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
60Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
61Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2000).
13In the ﬁrst district court opinion on WLF’s motion for summary judgment, the court initially acknowledged
that FDAMA §401 would supersede the two FDA Guidances on enduring materials, but continued to ﬁnd that
the three FDA Guidances were incompatible with the First Amendment.62 The district court quickly rejected
the FDA’s contentions that the Guidance Documents restrained conduct rather than speech and that the
speech in question fell outside of the protection of the First Amendment because of the extensive regulation
of the food and drug industry.63 Instead, the district court determined that the manufacturer speech in
question was properly considered commercial speech, entitled to a reduced degree of First Amendment
protection, because the manufacturer sought to promote and induce the purchase of its product through its
speech.64 Although the manufacturer speech involved was of a scientiﬁc nature, typically considered at the
core of First Amendment protection, the district court found scientiﬁc information disseminated by drug
manufacturers to be a particularly important and prevalent marketing tool.65 The court cited “the potential
to mislead, and the harm that could result” as further support for characterizing the manufacturer speech
in question as commercial speech.66
Having determined that the manufacturer speech was commercial in nature, the district court went on to
apply the Central Hudson four-prong test for commercial speech, which requires a court to analyze four
elements: (1) the commercial speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;” (2) the proposed
speech regulation must be supported by a “substantial” government interest; (3) the restriction must directly
and materially advance the government’s interest; and (4) the restriction must be narrowly tailored so as
62WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
63Id. at 59-60.
64Id. at 64.
65Id.
66Id. at 65.
14to not be “more extensive than is necessary” to serve the government interest.67 The district court ﬂatly
rejected FDA’s argument that manufacturer speech concerning oﬀ-label uses is inherently unlawful because
it has not yet met with FDA approval, asserting that by making this argument, “FDA exaggerate[d] its
overall place in the universe.”68
In considering the second prong of the Central Hudson analysis, the district court distinguished between the
two interests asserted by FDA: (1) ensuring that physicians receive accurate and unbiased information so that
they may make informed prescription choices, and (2) providing manufacturers with ample incentive to get
previously unapproved uses on label. The district court dismissed the ﬁrst asserted interest, stating that “to
endeavor to support a restriction upon speech by alleging that the recipient needs to be shielded from that
speech for his or her own protection” is “wholly and completely unsupportable.”69 As to the second asserted
interest, however, the district court found that there was suﬃcient evidence that dissemination of scientiﬁc
information to physicians on a drug’s oﬀ-label uses has a positive eﬀect upon sales of the drug, such that
making ability to disseminate information on oﬀ-label use contingent upon FDA approval of that use would
encourage manufacturers to obtain FDA approval.70 The district court thus found a “substantial government
interest” as contemplated by Central Hudson.71 The district court then found that the Guidance Documents
directly advanced this substantial government interest in requiring manufacturers to submit supplemental
applications to obtain approval for new use because constraining marketing options provided manufacturers
with an incentive to get new uses on-label.72
67Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
68WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66-67.
69Id. at 69-70.
70Id. at 70-71.
71Id. at 71.
72Id. at 72.
15When the district court turned to the fourth Central Hudson prong, however, it determined that the Guidance
Documents were unconstitutional because they contained restrictions that were considerably more extensive
than necessary to further the substantial governmental interest in encouraging manufacturers to get new
uses on-label.73 The court pointed to less-burdensome alternatives to the Guidances’ restrictions as evidence
that they were overly extensive, speciﬁcally noting that “full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the
manufacturer” might more precisely serve the government’s substantial interest.74 Having determined that
the Guidances did not comply with the First Amendment, the district court “enjoined FDA from ‘in any
way...limiting any pharmaceutical...manufacturer’ from ‘disseminating’ speciﬁed journal articles or medical
texts and from ‘suggesting content or speakers’ to an ‘independent program provider’ in connection with a
seminar or symposium funded by the manufacturer.”75
The district court reviewed its decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman in light of the pas-
sage of the FDAMA in 1997 to determine whether the FDA’s policies, as embodied in the FDAMA, were
unconstitutional.76 In this district court proceeding, Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, FDA took
the position that a manufacturer violated the FD&C Act by disseminating enduring materials, unless those
materials met the requirements of §401 of the FDAMA, and that such violations were actionable by the
FDA.77 The district court again applied the Central Hudson analysis and determined that the FDAMA, like
the Guidance Documents, was unconstitutional because its regulations burdened signiﬁcantly more speech
than necessary to advance the government’s substantial interest.78
73Id. at 73.
74Id.
75Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,287 (citing WLF v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at
88-89).
76WLF v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
77Id. at 83.
78Id. at 87.
16On February 11, 2000, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the district court’s
decisions and injunctions insofar as they declared §401 and the CME guidance document unconstitutional.
79 The Court of Appeals’ decision was based on FDA’s reversal of its position regarding the independent
enforceability of §401 of the FDAMA; after losing in the district court, FDA contended on appeal that a drug
manufacturer’s noncompliance with §401 does not, by itself, constitute a violation of the law, although a
manufacturer who disregards the conditions of the FDAMA safe harbor might be liable in some fashion if it
breached an agreement with the Secretary pursuant to that section.80 Furthermore, FDA asserted a similar
position regarding the legal eﬀect of the CME Guidance, while claiming that it retained the prerogative to
use promotional conduct as evidence in a misbranding or “intended use” enforcement action.81
The D.C. Circuit found that there was no case or controversy to provide a basis for WLF’s facial First
Amendment challenge, given FDA’s interpretation that:
(1) §401 provides a ‘safe harbor’ ensuring that certain forms of conduct [will] not be used
against manufacturers in misbranding and ‘intended use enforcement actions’ based on pre-
FDAMA enforcement authority, and (2) neither FDAMA nor the CME Guidance Document
‘independently authorizes the FDA to prohibit or sanction speech.82
As WLF expressly agreed that FDA could proceed on a case-by-case basis under pre-FAMA enforcement
authority, the D.C. Circuit found that there was no constitutional controversy between the parties that
remained to be resolved, and declined to rule on the constitutionality of a hypothetical interpretation of the
statute.83
79WLF v. Henney, 202 F.3d at 337.
80Id. at 335-36.
81Id.
83WLF v. Henney, 202 F.3d at 336.
17In a subsequent Notice printed in the Federal Register, FDA clariﬁed that the position it asserted on appeal
in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney represented the agency’s current approach to regulating man-
ufacturer speech on oﬀ-label uses.84 The agency explained that FDAMA and its implementing regulations
constitute a “safe harbor” for a manufacturer that complies with them in disseminating enduring materials.85
“If a manufacturer does not comply, FDA may bring an enforcement action under the FDCA, and seek to use
journal articles and reference texts disseminated by the manufacturer as evidence that an approved product
is intended for a ‘new use.”’86 However, FDA will only use a manufacturer’s dissemination as evidence in a
misbranding suit if the manufacturer has taken itself out of the safe harbor by disseminating in a way contrary
to the FDAMA.87 The key distinction is that “FDA’s prosecutorial power ﬂows from its long-established
authority to prosecute manufacturers for misbranding, not from the newly created FDAMA.”88 The FDA
expressed a similar interpretation regarding CME.89 The 1997 Guidance details the factors FDA will take
into account in exercising its enforcement discretion, but the document “does not itself have the force and
eﬀect of law.”90
After FDA published this Notice in the Federal Register, WLF returned to the district court on remand,
asking the court to “conﬁrm and enforce [its] continuing injunction” of July 28, 1999 (the initial injunction
issued in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman).91 WLF argued that FDA’s statement in the Notice
that the agency may, when appropriate, “proceed, in the context of a case-by-case enforcement, to determine
from a manufacturer’s written materials and activities how it intends that its products be used” violated
the district court’s July 28, 1999 injunction.92 Although the Court of Appeals had indicated that “part of
84Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,287.
85Id.
86Id.
87Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
88Id. (emphasis in original).
89Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,287.
90Id.
91WLF v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14.
92Id.at 13.
18[the district court’s] injunction still stands,” the district court interpreted that statement as referring only
to any parts of the injunction that were not constitutionally based.93 The district court found that its July
28, 1999 injunction was entirely based on the United States Constitution, and therefore “the injunction was
wholly vacated as to the FDAMA and the CME Guidelines.”94 As a result, “there [was] nothing for the
Notice to violate,” and the court rejected WLF’s motion to conﬁrm the injunction.95 The district court’s
decision on remand thus clariﬁed that the Court of Appeals’ decision was controlling as to the entire scope
of the issue.
In addition to denying WLF’s motion to conﬁrm its injunction, the district court expressed frustration that
“[a]fter six years’ worth of briefs, motions, opinions, Congressional acts, and more opinions, the issue remains
100% unresolved, and the country’s drug manufacturers are still without clear guidance as to their permis-
sible conduct.”96 Since the district court’s decision on remand, FDA has issued numerous Warning Letters
and Untitled Letters to pharmaceutical manufacturers indicating that they are engaging in promotion of un-
approved uses of their drugs through disseminations of information.97 In these Warning Letters and Untitled
Letters, FDA has identiﬁed the promotional materials that purportedly violate the FD&C Act and requested
that the manufacturers immediately cease dissemination of those materials and other similar materials.98
FDA has further requested that the manufacturers “disseminate accurate and complete information to the
audiences that received the misleading messages,” and that the manufacturers respond in writing to FDA
with a description of their plan for compliance.99 These Warning Letters and Untitled Letters have not,
93Id. at 14 (citing WLF v. Henney, 202 F.3d at 337).
94Id. at 15 (citing WLF v. Henney, 202 F. 3d at 337).
95Id.
96Id.
97See e.g. FDA Warning Letter to Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. (August 2003), at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/2003/pravachol-wl.pdf (April 23, 2004); FDA Untitled Letter to Cephalon, Inc. (Jan-
uary 2002), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/2002/10183.pdf (April 23, 2004).
98FDA Warning Letter to Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. 6, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/2003/pravachol-wl.pdf.
99Id.
19however, indicated an intent to take further enforcement action against the manufacturers.100
Furthermore, in May 2002, FDA published a “Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues,” “seeking
public comment to ensure that its regulations, guidances, policies, and practices continue to comply with
the governing First Amendment case law.101 FDA speciﬁcally inquired:
7. Would permitting speech by manufacturer, distributor, and marketer about oﬀ-label
uses undermine the act’s requirement that new uses must be approved by the FDA? If so,
how? If not, why not? What is the extent of FDA’s ability to regulate speech concerning
oﬀ-label uses? And
8. Do FDA’s speech-related regulations advance the public health concerns they are de-
signed to address? Are there other alternative approaches that FDA could pursue to
accomplish those objectives with fewer restrictions on speech?102
These two questions reﬂect “two diﬀerent general approaches FDA might take in response to any future inval-
idation of its existing speech-restrictive policies governing oﬀ-label promotion” – FDA could either modify
existing policies to comport with constitutional requirements or move away from the current regulatory
approach and seek ‘alternative approaches’ to advance its interests.103
FDA Regulation of Manufacturer Speech and the First Amendment
The FDA’s constitutional ability to restrain manufacturer speech about oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs is
an extremely contentious topic, with the wide disparity in views well illustrated in the comments ﬁled in
100Id.; FDA Untitled Letter to Cephalon, Inc., at http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/2002/10183.pdf.
101Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942 (May 16, 2002).
103Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 455.
20response to the FDA’s “Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues.”104 While a number of questions
remain outstanding, some matters seem quite settled in the area of First Amendment constraints on FDA
speech regulation. As one commentator has suggested, “signiﬁcant First Amendment constraints on FDA
speech regulation are here to stay, but...FDA need not worry that its ability to ensure the safety and eﬃcacy
of marketed drugs will be hamstrung by First Amendment lawsuits.”105 A consensus of sorts has emerged
with regards to two important issues in this area. First, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson
v. Western States, FDA will likely be unable to argue that its use of speech to prove that a manufacturer
is engaging in prohibited conduct is not susceptible to First Amendment scrutiny.106 Furthermore, as
indicated by the Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman court, FDA speech regulations are most likely
to be regarded as commercial speech, subject to Central Hudson analysis.107 Finally, regardless of whether
manufacturer speech is in fact considered commercial in nature, “First Amendment limitations must be
recognized in any eﬀort to regulate the dissemination of oﬀ-label information” after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Western States and the lower court decisions in WLF.108
104Richard A. Samp, Courts Are Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug Administration Speech Regulation, 58 Food &
Drug L.J. 313, 313 (2003).
105Id.
106Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 445. In Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S 357 (2002), pharmacies challenged
the FDA’s ban on advertising compounded drugs set out in 21 USCS §353(a), claiming that it violated their free speech rights.
The parties agreed that the advertising and soliciting prohibited by the FDAMA constituted commercial speech and that the
Central Hudson analysis should be applied. Id. at 366. FDA did not attempt to claim that the prohibited advertisements were
about unlawful activity or were misleading, but asserted three interests, (1) “an interest in preserving the eﬀectiveness and
integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process and the protection of the public health that it provides”, (2) “preserving the
availability of compounded drugs for those individual patients who, for particularized medical reasons, cannot use commercially
available products that have been approved by the FDA,” and (3) “achieving the proper balance between those two independently
compelling but competing interests.” Id.at 368. The Supreme Court rejected the FDA’s contention that it was using speech
restrictions as a proxy for conduct restrictions, but found preserving the eﬀectiveness and integrity of the new drug approval
process to be an important governmental interest. Id.at 369-71. While the Court accepted FDA’s asserted interest, and that the
advertising ban might directly advance that interest, it found that FDA had failed to demonstrate that the speech restrictions
were “not more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interests.” Id. at 372.
107Id. at 314. But see Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 446-447, who claim that “it is likely that FDA policies restrict not
only commercial speech, but also a great deal of core scientiﬁc expression regarding oﬀ-label use.”
108George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food & Drug Administration’s Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer
Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 Food & Drug L.J. 365, 443-44 (2003).
21III. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse and the Civil False Claims Act
“Over the past decade, the health care community has witnessed dramatic changes in the government’s eﬀorts
to enforce its fraud and abuse laws.”109 Health care fraud has become a major national law enforcement
priority, as Americans concerned about the future of public health programs learn about the prevalence
of health care fraud.110 “A recent audit by the Department of Health and Human Services Oﬃce of the
Inspector General estimated that the Medicare program improperly paid out $12.1 billion dollars in ﬁscal
year 2001 alone.”111 During the mid-1990s, then-Attorney General Janet Reno called health care fraud her,
“number two new initiative, behind violent crime.”112
The Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§3729-3733
In this atmosphere of cracking down on health care fraud, the Civil False Claims Act (FCA) [has emerged
as] the government’s “primary litigative tool for combating fraud.” 113 Although the FCA is a Civil War-era
statute, it has recently become the “primary weapon in the ﬁght against health care fraud.”114 The FCA
empowers both the Attorney General and private persons to institute civil actions to enforce the Act.115 The
Act prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government and provides
109Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives 112 (Linda A. Baumann, ed., ABA Health Law Section,
2002).
110Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1363,
1367 (March 2002).
111Id.
112Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims
Act, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 121, 134 (Fall 2001).
113Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 113.
114Krause, supra note 110, at 1367.
11531 U.S.C. §3730 (2004).
22for statutory penalties of $5500 to $11,000 per claim, plus treble damages.116 The FCA’s powerful qui
tam provisions allow private persons, “relators,” to sue on the government’s behalf, thereby increasing the
likelihood of enforcement.117 Before 1986, the FCA was relatively unused; however, amendments in that year
modernized the Act, and the government’s recoveries under the FCA have skyrocketed as a result, totaling
more than $4 billion over the last decade.118 This proliferation of FCA suits has been accompanied by a
“marked expansion in the number and types of activities targeted by the law. While the FCA initially was
applied to straightforward fraudulent actions such as billing the government for health care services that
were not rendered, more innovative theories of liability have recently emerged.”119
History of the False Claims Act
The Civil False Claims Act, also known as the “Informer’s Act” or “Lincoln’s Law,” 120 was enacted on March
2, 1863 in response to “rampant fraud” against the Union Army during the Civil War.121 The drafters of the
Act were primarily concerned with fraud on military contractors, but the Act also applied to fraud commit-
ted by all government contractors.122 Violators of the original FCA were subject to both civil and criminal
penalties, and the 1863 Act “prohibited a wide variety of oﬀenses against the government, including making
false, ﬁctitious, or fraudulent claims, and using false or fraudulent documentation to get claims paid.”123
The 1863 Act also included an unusual feature in its qui tam provisions, under which a private person could
bring suit “as well for himself as for the United States” and retain half the total recovery.124 Few decisions
11631 U.S.C. §3729(a) (2004); Adjustments to Penalties, 28 C.F.R. §85.3(a)(9) (2004).
11731 U.S.C. §3730(b)(2) (2004).
118Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 114.
119Krause, supra note 110, at 1367-68.
120Joel M. Androphy & Mark A. Correro, Whistleblower and Federal Qui Tam Litigation – Suing the Corporation for Fraud,
45 S.Tex. L. Rev. 23, 26 (Winter 2003).
121Krause, supra note 110 at 1370; Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (current version at 31 U.S.C. §3729 (2004)).
122Androphy & Correro, supra note 120, at 26.
123Krause, supra note 112, at 129.
124Id.
23were reported under the FCA before 1930, and the Act went through a number of recodiﬁcations during the
period.125
The most recent and extensive amendments to the FCA occurred in 1986 and were the result of increased
concern over federal program fraud throughout the 1970s.126 “The 1986 Amendments were designed to recast
the Civil War-era statute as an eﬀective weapon against modern forms of government fraud, particularly in
defense procurement and the federal health care programs.”127 The Amendments focused on the qui tam
provision of the FCA, as “Congress wanted to reward private individuals who take signiﬁcant personal risks
by bringing wrongdoing to light, to break conspiracies of silence among employees of malfeasors, and to
encourage whistleblowing and disclosure of fraud.”128
The 1986 Amendments expanded the scope of the FCA’s scienter standard, eliminating the need to prove
speciﬁc intent and making defendants liable for acting with “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard”
of the truth.129 The amendments set the burden of proof on an FCA claim at “a preponderance of the
evidence,”130 and lengthened the statute of limitations from six years to a variable ten.131 Congress mod-
ernized the FCA penalty provisions, increasing the government’s recovery amounts from double to treble
damages and from $2000 per claim to $5000 to $10,000 per claim in civil monetary penalties.132 A number
of amendments speciﬁcally focused on the Act’s qui tam provisions, one such amendment eliminated the
1943 jurisdictional bar which “precluded recovery on any violation for which the government already pos-
sessed information, and instituted a ‘public disclosure’ bar.”133 Congress also included an “original source”
exception to the jurisdictional bar, whereby a relator could pursue an action based on publicly disclosed in-
125Id. at 130.
126Id. at 132; Act of Oct. 29, 1986, §2, 100 Stat. 3153 (current version at 31 U.S.C. §3729 (2004)).
127Krause, supra note 112, at 133.
128Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 27 (citing United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853,858 (7th Cir. 1999)).
12931 U.S.C. §3729(b) (2004); Id. at 28.
13031 U.S.C. §3729(c) (2004); Krause, supra note 112, at 133.
13131 U.S.C. §3731(b)(1)-(2) (2004); Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 28.
13231 U.S.C. §3729(a) (2004). Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 114.
13331 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4)(A) (2004); Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 28.
24formation if s/he could show that s/he was the initial source of the information.134 Finally, the amendments
increased the relator’s award to 15-25% of the proceeds (or 25-30% if the government declined to join the
suit), and expanded the relator’s right to participate in the action.135 Congress also “prohibited employers
from retaliating against whistleblowers who initiate or assist in a qui tam action.”136
The 1986 Amendments have drastically increased the number of FCA claims, and speciﬁcally the number
of qui tam claims ﬁled by relators. “While only 33 qui tam cases were ﬁled in 1987, more than 360 cases
have been ﬁled each year since 1997.”137 “The health care industry has been especially hard hit, with every
sector – hospitals, ﬁscal agents, peer review organizations, physicians, researchers, laboratories, home health
agencies, long-term care facilities, and suppliers and billing services, among others – having been the target
of an FCA action.”138 Health care qui tam suits have grown dramatically relative to similar suits in other
industries. In 1987, 12% of qui tam suits concerned programs regulated by the Department of Health and
Human Services; by 1998, the percentage had grown to 61%.139 It is projected that recoveries over the
next decade will continue to increase – “one private group has estimated that the government, from 1996 to
2006..., will recover more than $21 billion.”140
The Current Civil False Claims Act
The FCA prohibits any person from (1) knowingly presenting, or causing to be presented false or fraudulent
claims for payment or approval, or (2) knowingly making, using, or causing to be made or used, false records
or statements to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the government.141 Violators are liable
13431 U.S.C. §3730(d)(4)(A) (2004); Krause, supra note 112, at 134.
13531 U.S.C. §§3730(c)(1), 3730(d)(1)-(2) (2004); Krause, supra note 112, at 134.
13631 U.S.C. §3730(h) (2004); Krause, supra note 112, at 134.
137Krause, supra note 112, at 134.
138Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 116.
139Krause, supra note 112, at 134.
140Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 116.
14131 U.S.C. §3729(a).
25for a civil penalty of $7500 to $15,000 per claim, plus treble the government’s damages.142 In addition
to sections 3729(a)(1) and (a)(2), section 3729(a)(3) prohibits conspiracies “to defraud the Government by
getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid.”143 To establish an FCA violation, a plaintiﬀ must
establish a number of elements – “the plaintiﬀ generally must prove that: (1) the ‘person’; (2) ‘present[ed]’
or ‘cause[d] to be presented’; (3) ‘a false or fraudulent’; (4) ‘claim,’ ‘record or statement’; (5) ‘knowingly’; (6)
to ‘the United States [government]’; that was (7) ‘material’ to the government’s determination to pay.”144
The “false or fraudulent” and “knowing” elements of the FCA have produced the most litigation under the
statute.145 Other elements of the FCA have proven easier in application. The FCA imposes liability on
persons who “present” or “cause to be presented” false or fraudulent claims.146 “Cause-to-be-presented”
liability applies “where the person responsible for the falsity does not actually submit the claim, but rather
directs others (who may not know of the falsity) to submit the claim on his or her behalf.147 This type of
liability may apply to entities that oﬀer billing advice to health care providers, and would most likely be the
theory of liability used in a case based on manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses.148
Although the FCA does not deﬁne the term “claim,” courts have interpreted it as “a demand for money or
for some transfer of public property.”149 Under current judicial interpretation, essentially “any action by the
claimant which has the purpose and eﬀect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated
to pay...[is properly considered a ‘claim’] within the meaning of the FCA.”150 The most controversial type
14231 U.S.C. §3729(a)(4) provides for a penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 per claim, but the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act of 2003, which became eﬀective on January 1, 2004, increased the range to between $7,500 and $15,000.
P.L. 108-173 (Dec. 8, 2003).
14331 U.S.C. §3729(a)(3) (2004).
144Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 117-18.
145Id. at 118.
14631 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1) (2004).
147Krause, supra note 112, at 140.
148Id.
149Pamela H. Bucy, Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 57, 62-63
(1999).
150Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 35.
26of claim in FCA litigation has been the “reverse false claim,” which involves the use of false records “to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.”151 The
1986 Amendments made clear that Congress intended to prohibit such claims.152
The FCA has always included the requirement that a defendant “knowingly” present or cause to be presented
false claims, however the term “knowingly” was not deﬁned until the 1986 Amendments.153 The FCA now
deﬁnes “knowing” and “knowingly” to mean that a person: “(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2)
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information.”154 The FCA clearly provides that “no proof of speciﬁc intent to defraud
is required;”155 however, mere negligence and “innocent mistakes” will not suﬃce to establish liability under
the FCA.156 The drafters of the 1986 Amendments explained these changes as serving two purposes: making
it easier to prove liability under the FCA, and standardizing the mens rea requirement.157 The legislative
history indicates that Congress was concerned about two types of conduct that some courts had found to
be not actionable prior to 1986.158 First, where “a provider submitted claims in a sloppy, unsupervised
fashion without due care regarding the accuracy of the claim” and second, where “a provider deliberately
refused to learn additional facts that, if learned, would disclose that the claim was inaccurate.”159 The 1986
clariﬁcation of “knowingly” aimed to make it more diﬃcult for corporate oﬃcers to “insulate themselves
15131 U.S.C. §3729(a)(7) (2004).
152Bucy, supra note 149, at 63.
153Id. at 60.
15431 U.S.C. §3729(b).
155Id.
156Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 36.
157S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5272; Bucy, supra note 149, 61.
158Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 135 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. 20, 535-36
(Aug. 11, 1986)).
159Id.
27from knowledge of false claims submitted by lower-level subordinates.”160
The terms “false” and “fraudulent” are not deﬁned in the FCA, but “courts have held that a claim cannot
be ‘false’ if submitted pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of vague statutory language.”161 Courts have
found falsity where defendants presented health care claims or statements that were literally false, with false
information reported on the claim form.162 In addition, under the “express certiﬁcation” theory, courts
have found that where government payment is expressly conditioned on certifying compliance with certain
laws, a claimant may violate the FCA if it failed to comply with the requirement but certiﬁed that it had
complied.163 Finally, some courts have been willing to consider whether FCA claims are false by omission
or “implicitly” false “because of the violation of a rule or regulation that is not speciﬁcally referenced in the
claim itself.”164
Theories of Liability Under the FCA
There are ﬁve traditional types of FCA cases, according to author John T. Boese – (1) the “Mischarge”
case; (2) the “Fraud-in-the-Inducement” or “False Negotiation” case; (3) the “False Certiﬁcation” case; (4)
the “Substandard Product or Service” case; and (5) the “Reverse False Claim” case.165 “Mischarge” cases
involve the common element of a claim made to the government for goods and services that were not pro-
160Bucy, supra note 149, at 61.
161Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 37.
162Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 120.
163See e.g. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
164Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 123.
165John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions §1.06, 1-39 (2d. ed. 2003).
28vided in the manner set forth in the claim, either because a bill is submitted to the government for goods
and services that are never delivered, or because the government is billed for a higher-price good or service
than is actually provided.166 In “Fraud-in-the-Inducement” or “False Negotiation” cases, false statements
are made or illegal actions undertaken during the course of bidding on or negotiating federal contracts.167
“False Certiﬁcation” cases arise where parties either explicitly or implicitly falsely certify “statutory or reg-
ulatory compliance, or... 168 the existence (or non-existence) of certain conditions, which are alleged to
be a prerequisite to the government’s payment.” When a supplier of goods or services provides an inferior
substitute in place of the service or product contracted for, the case is one of “substandard product.”169
Finally, as discussed above, “Reverse False Claim” cases involve situations where parties use false records to
decrease or avoid a ﬁnancial obligation to the government.170
In all of these cases, the conduct that creates liability is some sort of fraud on the government. While the
Supreme Court has stated that “the False Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced
on the Government,” FCA liability has been widely construed since the 1986 Amendments.171 Indeed, “now,
with only a few exceptions, most conduct that illegally increases payment by the government of revenues
to which it is entitled, has been held (correctly or not) to trigger FCA liability.”172 FCA liability most
commonly arises under Subsection 3729(a)(1), discussed above, which prohibits any person from “knowingly
present[ing] or caus[ing] to be presented...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”173 A number
of courts have held that the government need not actually pay the claim for FCA liability to arise, and courts
have split over the need for damages under subsection 3729(a)(1), with some courts ﬁnding liability “even
166Id. at §1.06[a], 1-39.
167Id. at §1.06[B], 1-40.
168Id. at §1.06[C], 1-41.
169Id. at §1.06[D], 1-42.
170Krause, supra note 110, at 1380.
171United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958); Boese, supra note 165, at §2, 2-5.
172Boese, supra note 165, at §2, 2-5 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 788 (4th Cir. 1999)).
173Boese, supra note 165, at §2.01[A], 2-8; 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1).
29in the absence of a negative ﬁnancial impact on the government.”174 As discussed above, liability under
subsection 3729(a)(1) extends not only to those who submit false claims to the government for payment but
also to those who “cause” a false claim to be presented, even if they are not the actual presenters of the
claim. “Cause-to-be-presented” liability is at issue in most of today’s FCA litigation, given the nature of
modern business practices.175 “Cause-to-be-presented” liability does not require the person submitting the
claim to know that it is false, thus “a health care provider who bills Medicare through a hospital’s billing
system or an outside billing service is liable if the claims are false, even though a third party innocently
submits the bills.”176
FCA liability under subsection 3729(a)(2) attaches where a person “knowingly makes, uses or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved....”177 This
section can also be used to implicate defendants that did not personally submit a false claim to the govern-
ment, and thus may be used in situations of “cause-to-be-presented” liability.178 Violations of subsection
3729(a)(2) are more diﬃcult to prove than violations of subsection (a)(1) because the government (or relator)
must prove that the “claim” is “knowingly” false, and also “(1) that the record supporting the claim is false
and (2) that the record is made or used for the purpose of causing the false claim to be paid.”179
The Qui Tam Provision of the FCA
In addition to providing for actions by the government to enforce the FCA, the FCA allows private persons,
174Boese, supra note 165, at §2.01[A], 2-9.
175Id. at 2-10.
176Id. at 2-11 (citing United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F.Supp. 2d at 39).
17731 U.S.C. §3729(a)(2).
178Boese, supra note 165, at §2.01[B], 2-22.
179Id. at 2-23-24.
30known as relators, to act as “private attorneys general” in bringing suit under the Act’s qui tam provisions.180
The rationale for the qui tam provision, as expressed in 1986, is that “in the face of sophisticated and
widespread fraud...only a coordinated eﬀort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease th[e]
wave of defrauding public funds.”181 Despite statutory caps on relators’ recoveries, qui tam suits may allow
signiﬁcant recoveries; the average relators’ recovery is one million dollars, but some recent recoveries include
$42 million to relators on a $333,976 million settlement, $2.34 million to relators on a $12.65 million recovery,
and $2.4 million to relators on a $10 million recovery.182
The qui tam provisions include elaborate procedures that relators must follow in bringing suits under the
FCA.183 The relator is required to serve the complaint on the government along with written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information the relator possesses regarding the compliant.184 The
complaint is ﬁled in camera and remains under seal for at least 60 days, during which time the government
investigates the allegations and decides whether or not to formally intervene.185 After investigating, if the
government decides the allegations have merit, the Department of Justice intervenes in the action, unseals
the complaint, and assumes primary responsibility for prosecuting the case.186 The government may then
move to settle or dismiss the case over the objections of the relator.187 If the government believes the claim
lacks merit and declines to intervene, it notiﬁes the court of its decision, and the relator has the right to
prosecute the action, but is not obligated to do so.188
The success of a qui tam action, as well as the relator’s right to recovery may turn on whether the government
decides to intervene or not. If the government intervenes and prevails on the merits, it is entitled to recover
treble damages plus $7,500 to $15,000 for each false claim submitted.189 In this case, the relator usually
18031 U.S.C. §3730(b)(2); Bucy, supra note 149, at 87.
181S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 7; Bucy, supra note 149, at 87.
182Id.
189Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, P.L. 108-173.
31receives 15 to 25% of the government’s recovery plus reimbursement of reasonable legal fees and expenses.190
If the government does not intervene in the action, the relator can recover between 25 and 30% of the
government’s recovery, plus reimbursement of reasonable legal fees and expenses.191 Where the government
declines to intervene in qui tam cases, FCA actions generally do not result in any governmental recovery.192
As of November 1999, the DOJ intervened in approximately 21 percent of all qui tam cases, and recovered
$2.9 billion in those cases. The 79 percent of qui tam cases in which the government did not intervene,
however, only amounted to $410 million in recovery (13 percent of the government’s total recoveries).193
The FCA places three signiﬁcant limitations on relators’ ability to bring qui tam suits in the form of
jurisdictional bars that prevent courts from hearing certain types of actions. Subsection 3730(e)(4) prohibits
qui tam actions based on information that has already been publicly disclosed unless the relator is the
government’s original source of the information.194 Subsection 3730(e)(3) of the FCA prohibits qui tam
actions based upon allegations or transactions that are the subject of a civil or administrative suit to which
the government is already a party.195 Subsection 3730(b)(5) prohibits all actions based on facts underlying
a pending action.196 These three jurisdictional bars compel various “races”– subsection 3730(e)(4) requires
relators to report fraud before it is publicized, subsection 3730(e)(3) forces relators to race the government
to the courthouse, and subsection 3730(b)(5) has relators racing each other to the court house.197 Each of
these provisions aim “to compel whistleblowers to disclose perceived wrongdoing to the government at the
19031 U.S.C. §§3729(a) and 3730(d)(1). The relator’s right to recovery depends on his/her contribution to the action; also,
under §3730(d)(1), the relator’s recovery may be capped at 20% if it is based on certain types of information.
19131 U.S.C. §3730(d).
192Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 149.
193Id. at 149-50 (citing Qui Tam Statistics available at http://www.taf.org).
19431 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4).
19531 U.S.C. §3730(e)(3).
19631 U.S.C. §3730(b)(5).
197Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 153.
32earliest possible moment.”198
The jurisdictional bar that has resulted in the most litigation and the dismissal of a substantial number of
actions is the public disclosure jurisdictional bar.199 The public disclosure jurisdictional bar was not included
in the original FCA enacted in 1863, but was added to the statute in 1943, “after a series of abuses in which
private persons ﬁled qui tam actions based expressly on public information.”200 Most strikingly, in the
Supreme Court case United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, a relator used information from a publicly ﬁled
indictment, which had already resulted in a conviction, to ﬁle a qui tam action.201 The Court noted that
strong policy arguments advised against the statutory plan, but that those arguments were properly directed
to Congress as the current statute allowed qui tam relators to ﬁle based on public information.202 Congress
reacted by including the public disclosure jurisdictional bar provision, which aimed to prevent “parasitic
suits,” providing that no action could be ﬁled based on information in the government’s possession, even if
the relator was the original source of the information.203
Congress reconsidered the public disclosure jurisdictional bar in passing the 1986 Amendments, this time
spurred to action by a Seventh Circuit case. In United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, the state of
Wisconsin successfully prosecuted Alice R. Dean, M.D. under its criminal statutes for submitting fraudulent
claims under Medicaid.204 Wisconsin then reported the conviction to the federal government, as required
by the Medicaid program and proceeded to ﬁle a qui tam suit as relator to recover from Dean damages
resulting from the fraudulent claims.205 The Seventh Circuit found itself forced to dismiss the suit because
it was based upon evidence in possession of the United States at the time the complaint was ﬁled, and thus
198Id.
199Id. at 150.
200Id. at 151.
201United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
202Id. at 540; Bucy, supra note 149, at 90.
203Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 151.
204United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
205Id. at 1102.
33subject to the jurisdictional bar in place at the time, despite the fact that the state of Wisconsin was the
original source of the information at issue in the suit.206 Congress reacted by altering the public disclosure
jurisdictional bar so as to allow actions based on public information if the whistleblower was the “original
source” of the publicly disclosed information.207 The current public disclosure jurisdictional bar prevents a
court from considering:
an action...based upon the disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil,
or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Oﬃce report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of
the information.208
Qui tam suits are ordinarily allowed under the FCA because when information is not in the public domain the
government may not be aware of the information and is thus unable to act on it in the public interest; qui tam
suits therefore increase the government’s access to relevant information.209 When information is publicly
known, however, qui tam suits are barred unless the relator was the government’s original source of the
information.210 The rationale behind this policy is that once allegations of fraud have been publicly disclosed,
the whistleblower’s action will not advance the public interest because the government is aware of the
information and may pursue the action. Thus, a qui tam suit based on publicly disclosed information may in
fact hinder the public interest because the government is compelled to share a portion of its recovery with the
relator, who has done nothing more than republish public allegations.211 The public disclosure jurisdictional
bar is therefore meant to ensure that “qui tam actions [will] augment the government’s recoveries in FCA
actions and, at the same time, eliminate qui tam actions when such actions [are] not needed to protect the
206Id. at 1104.
207Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 151.
209Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 152.
21031 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4)(A).
211Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 152.
34federal ﬁsc.”212
While the public disclosure jurisdictional bar clearly has laudable aims, it has engendered a great deal
of litigation over the various issues involved in its application. “In order to invoke the public disclosure
jurisdictional bar successfully, [a] defendant must establish...: (1) that there has been a ‘public disclosure,’
(2) of ‘allegations or transactions,’ (3) in a ‘criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Oﬃce report, hearing, adit, or investigation, or from the news
media,’ and (4) that the relator’s action is ‘based upon’ that public disclosure.”213 The three most diﬃcult
questions to resolve in applying the public disclosure jurisdictional bar are: “whether the allegations in the
FCA action have been previously disclosed publicly, (2) whether the lawsuit is ‘based upon’ the publicly
disclosed information, and (3) whether the qui tam relator is an ‘original source’ of the information.”214
These three questions have given rise to a signiﬁcant body of case law construing the public disclosure
jurisdictional bar.215
Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursement of Prescription Drugs
The Medicare and Medicaid programs each provide for limited prescription drug beneﬁts for beneﬁciaries.
Generally, individuals who are 65 and are entitled to Social Security or Railroad Retirement beneﬁts are
automatically entitled to and enrolled in Medicare Part A (which typically covers inpatient hospital services)
212Id. (citing Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
213Id. at 155.
214Bucy, supra note 149, at 88.
215Id.; Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 155.
35and will be deemed to have also enrolled in Medicare Part B (which typically covers outpatient health
care expenses, including doctors fees).216 Medicaid is only available to “certain low-income individuals
and families who ﬁt into an eligibility group that is recognized by federal and state law.”217 Medicaid is
administered by individual states, each of which (1) establishes its own eligibility standards, (2) determines
the type, amount, duration, and scope of services, (3) sets the rate of payment for services, and (4) administers
its own program.218
The prescription drug beneﬁts available to beneﬁciaries vary by program. The Original Medicare Program
generally does not cover prescription drugs, but supplemental insurance plans (Medigap plans) and Medi-
care+Choice plans (currently also known as MedicareHMOs, will oﬃcially be called Medicare Advantage
as of 2004) may allow prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneﬁciaries. The speciﬁc prescription drug
beneﬁts available under Medigap plans are tied to the deﬁnition of “outpatient prescription drugs,” while the
speciﬁc prescription drug beneﬁts available under Medicare+Choice plans are determined by the individual
private insurer’s formulary.219 Medicare will begin covering prescription drugs in 2006, under the Medi-
care Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003.220 Medicaid makes prescription drug
coverage an optional service, which states may receive matching federal funding to provide.221 All states
currently provide prescription drug coverage under Medicaid, subject to a number of strict limitations.222
Medicare, Medigap, and Medicare+Choice Prescription Drug Beneﬁts
216Social Security Act §406, 42 U.S.C. §1395p(f) (2004).
217Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, What Is Medicaid?, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/whatismedicaid.asp,
(March 18, 2004).
218Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid: A Brief Summary, at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-medicare-medicaid/default4.asp, (March 18, 2004).
219Debra A. Draper et al., How do M+C Plans Manage Pharmacy Beneﬁts? Implications for Medicare Reform 12, Kaiser
Family Foundation (March 2003), http://www.kﬀ.org, (March 19, 2004).
220Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, P.L. 108-173.
221Medicaid: A Brief Summary, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-medicare-medicaid/default4.asp.
222Harvey L. McCormick, Medicare and Medicaid Claims and Procedures, §23.102, 210 (3d. ed. 2001).
36The Medicare program currently does not cover most outpatient prescription drugs, so Medicare beneﬁciaries
must pay 100% of their prescription drug costs unless they are covered by a supplemental plan.223 Through
the Medicare Part B program, Medicare will cover a very limited number of outpatient prescription drugs,
mostly cancer drugs.224 Medicare Part B requires beneﬁciaries to pay a monthly premium, and beneﬁciaries
must still pay 20% of the costs of the limited outpatient drugs that Medicare covers.225
In addition to basic Medicare beneﬁts, beneﬁciaries may have some prescription drug coverage under either
a Medigap insurance plan or a Medicare+Choice plan. As of the Fall of 1999, 7% of non-institutionalized
Medicare beneﬁciaries had prescription drug coverage under Medigap plans, and 15% had prescription drug
coverage through Medicare+Choice plans.226 Medigap plans are sold by private insurance companies to
“bridge the gap” between what the Original Medicare Plan pays and the balance of the beneﬁciary’s medical
bills.227 Federal law requires insurers to sell Medigap policies that are one of ten standard supplemental
plans created by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (formerly the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA)) in all states but Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.228 Only two of the ten
standard supplemental plans provide a basic prescription drug beneﬁt, and one of the standard supplemental
plans provides an extended prescription drug beneﬁt.229
223Your Medicare Coverage, (accessed for Massachusetts and Florida), at http://www.medicare.gov, (March 18, 2004). Ac-
cording to the Kaiser Family Foundation website, “Prescription drug use increases with age along with the prevalence of
chronic and acute health problems. However, because Medicare does not cover outpatient prescription drugs, 38% of seniors
and younger beneﬁciaries with disabilities had no drug coverage in the Fall of 1999.” Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription
Drugs: Medicare, at http://www.kﬀ.org/rxdrugs/medicare.cfm, (March 19, 2004).
224Your Medicare Coverage, at http://www.medicare.gov. In order for Medicare to cover any prescription drugs, a pharmacy
or doctor must accept assignment on the drugs. Covered drugs include: some antigens, osteoporosis drugs, erythropoietin (for
end-stage renal disease), hemophilia clotting factors, injectable drugs, immunosuppressive drugs, some oral cancer drugs, and
oral anti-nausea drugs for people getting Medicare-covered oral anti-cancer drugs.
225Id.
226Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare and Prescription Drugs Fact Sheet 1, April 2003, http://www.kﬀ.org, (March 19,
2004).
2272003 Medicare Handbook, §8.01, 8-3 (Judith A. Stein and Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr, eds., 2003); Medigap Policy Basics, at
http://www.medicare.gov/medigap/default.asp, (March 18, 2004).
2282003 Medicare Handbook, id. at §8.02, 8-3, §8.03, 8-4.
229Id. at §8.03, 8-5. The basic beneﬁt has a $250 annual deductible, and covers 50% of prescription drug costs, with a
maximum beneﬁt of $1,250 annually. The extended beneﬁt also has a $250 annual deductible and covers 50% of prescription
drug costs, but has a maximum beneﬁt of $3,000 annually.
37As of April 2003, 11% of Medicare beneﬁciaries were enrolled in Medicare+Choice plans, however, the share
of Medicare+Choice enrollees in basic plans with drug coverage declined from 84% in 1999 to 69% in 2003.230
Medicare+Choice plans are oﬀered by private companies that contract with the Medicare program to oﬀer
Medicare Health Plans.231 Speciﬁc prescription drug coverage under Medicare+Choice plans varies by the
private insurer and coverage is usually based on the individual insurer’s formulary, a list of drugs that the plan
encourages physicians to prescribe for enrollees.232 Through their formulary structures, Medicare+Choice
plans steer beneﬁciaries toward cost eﬀective drug alternatives, when available.233 Medicare+Choice plans
typically use the same formulary as they do for their commercial insurance plans, with some exceptions.234
Formularies may be open, where all drugs are covered in the formulary, but beneﬁciaries are encouraged to
choose certain drugs through the copayment structure, or closed, where oﬀ-formulary drugs are not covered
(although medical exceptions may be made for drugs that are medically necessary through an approval
process).235
As of 2000, 33 states had passed legislation authorizing the use of formularies by Managed Care Organizations
(MCOs).236 Fifteen states required access to non-formulary drugs if (1) they are medically necessary, (2)
they are prescribed by a physician, and (3) the preferred drug is ineﬀective or reasonably expected to cause an
adverse or harmful reaction.237 In addition, ﬁfteen states required MCOs to provide coverage when scientiﬁc
results reported in the medical literature support the oﬀ-label use of a drug for a medical condition.238 “An
230Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare+Choice Fact Sheet 1-2 (April 2003), http://www.kﬀ.org, (March 19, 2004).
231Medicare Plan Choices, at http://www.medicare.gov/Choices/Overview.asp, (March 18, 2004).
232Medicare Personal Plan Finder, at http://www.medicare.gov, (March 18, 2004); How do M+C Plans Manage Pharmacy
Beneﬁts? Implications for Medicare Reform at 12, http://www.kﬀ.org.
233Id. at 11.
234Id. at 12.
235Id.
236Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, Ch. 5 “How Does the VA National Formulary Compare
with Private Insurance Formularies for Drugs and Devices and with Other Government Formularies?” 153 (David Blumenthal
and Roger Herdman eds. 2000), http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309069866/html/149.html, (March 12, 2004).
237Id.
238Id.
38additional 15 states speciﬁcally require[d] oﬀ-label coverage for the treatment of cancer.”239
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Medicare will begin to
cover some degree of prescription drugs in 2006.240 All Medicare beneﬁciaries will be able to enroll in a plan
that will cover prescription drugs. Individual plans may vary, but generally: (1) beneﬁciaries will choose a
plan and pay a premium of $35 per month, (2) beneﬁciaries will pay a $250 deductible, (3) Medicare will
pay 75% of costs between $250 and $2,250 in drug spending, the beneﬁciary will pay the other 25% of the
costs, (4) the beneﬁciary will pay 100% of drug costs above $2,250 until s/he reaches $3,600 in out-of-pocket
spending, and (5) Medicare will pay about 95% of costs after the beneﬁciary has spent $3,600.241 Extra help
will be available for people with low incomes and limited assets.242 No new Medigap plans with prescription
drug coverage will be sold after 2006, beneﬁciaries with Medigap policies with prescription drug coverage
may choose to renew their policies, but if they join a Medicare prescription drug plan, they will not be able
to renew their Medigap policy.243
Medigap and Medicare+Choice both currently oﬀer prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneﬁciaries,
and Medicare will begin oﬀering more extensive prescription drug coverage in 2006 (Part D plans), all of
which are or will be oﬀered through partnerships with private insurance companies that meet the eligibility
requirements for participating in the programs and enter into contracts with the Secretary of HHS.244 When
privately insured beneﬁciaries submit claims for drug coverage, such claims cannot by deﬁnition, constitute
false claims under the FCA, as they are not submitted to the government for payment. However, Medigap,
Medicare+Choice, and Medicare Part D plans are or will be provided through contracts between private
insurers and the Secretary of HHS. These contracts provide for risk sharing arrangements with the federal
239Id.
240P.L. 108-173.
241The Facts about Upcoming New Beneﬁts in Medicare, at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11054.pdf,
(March 18, 2004).
242Id.
243Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.medicare.gov/MedicareReform/, (March 18, 2004).
244Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription Drug Coverage for Medicare Beneﬁciaries: An Overview of the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 7 (January 2004), http://www.kﬀ.org, (March 19, 2004).
39government which create federal ﬁnancial involvement, and may thus create the potential for false claims
under the FCA if claims submitted ought not be paid under the Medicare laws.245
The degree of federal ﬁnancial involvement in these plans varies in amount and in complexity. Medicare
uses monthly per person county rates to determine payments to Medicare+Choice plan participants.246 Part
D plans will receive government reinsurance payments of 80% of allowable drug costs over the annual out-
of-pocket payment thresholds for an enrollee.247 “Allowable drug costs” means drug beneﬁt costs actually
paid by the plan or the enrollee.248 In addition, Part D plan contracts provide for risk corridors, which
limit the insurer’s risk of losing money but also limit its proﬁts by creating a target cost for a beneﬁt.249
Gains or losses inside the risk corridor around that target are borne by the private insurer, but additional
gains and losses outside the risk corridor are borne by the federal government.250 These two risk sharing
mechanisms implicate the federal treasury substantially in the prescription drug beneﬁt claims submitted
by beneﬁciaries under Medicare Part D plans and may therefore create the potential for false claims under
the FCA (discussed below).
Medicaid Prescription Drug Beneﬁts
The relationship between Medicaid and false claims under the FCA is much more straightforward, as Medicaid
costs are paid by the states, with matching funds from the federal government. Thus claims for prescription
drugs that should not be covered under the Medicaid laws are more clearly false claims under the FCA.
Medicaid currently allows for the coverage of prescription drugs, subject to strict limitations.251 Medicaid
245Id. at 7, http://www.kﬀ.org.
246Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Federal Payment Methodology to Medicare Health Plans Fact Sheet, at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=978, (March 19, 2004).
247Prescription Drug Coverage for Medicare Beneﬁciaries at 3, http://www.kﬀ.org.
248Id.
249Id. at 16.
250Id.
251McCormick, supra note 222, at §23.102, 210.
40prescription drug beneﬁts are administered through individual states’ Medical Assistance Programs under
Title XIX of the Social Security Act and applicable state laws.252 Outpatient prescription drugs are one of
the variety of optional services eligible for federal matching funds under Title XIX of the SSA, and every
state’s Medicaid program provides coverage for prescription drugs.253 The current Medicaid prescription
drug beneﬁt is governed by provisions enacted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993
(OBRA 1990, 1993), as well as Title XIX of the SSA.254
In order to receive federal matching funds for payment for covered outpatient drugs in any state, the man-
ufacturer must enter into a rebate agreement with HHS and the state must provide for drug use review.255
“Standardization of state formularies and prior approval systems is required. Medicaid now covers products
of manufacturers that have signed rebate agreements (as essentially all do) and may only exclude prod-
ucts in accordance with speciﬁc federal regulation.”256 “In general, when states elect to cover outpatient
prescription drugs through Medicaid, they must cover all Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved
pharmaceuticals of every manufacturer that has signed a federal drug rebate agreement with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services.”257 The rebate agreements require that the best price a manufacturer gives
to any other purchaser, including any cash or volume discount rebate, is automatically given to every Med-
icaid program.258 Within that framework, states have leeway to design and manage their prescription drug
beneﬁts, and many states aggressively manage their prescription drug beneﬁts in order to control costs.259
252Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, supra note 236, at 155,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309069866/html/149.html.
253Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, supra note 236, at 156-57,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309069866/html/149.html.
254Id. at 157; 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8 (2004).
25542 U.S.C. §1396r-8(a), (g). McCormick, supra note 222, at §23.102, 210.
256Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, supra note 236, at 158,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309069866/html/149.html.
257Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drug Beneﬁts: Findings From a
National Survey, 2003 i (December 2003), http://www.kﬀ.org, (March 19, 2004).
258Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, supra note 236, at 158,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309069866/html/149.html.
259Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drug Beneﬁts at i, iii, http://www.kﬀ.org. Some common mechanisms for managing the
41As noted above, states must cover FDA-approved products of manufacturers that have signed federal drug
rebate agreements with the Secretary of HHS. The caveat that products must be FDA-approved comes
from the restriction in the Social Security Act that deﬁnes “covered outpatient drug” by stating “the term
‘covered outpatient drug’ does not include any drug...used for a medical indication which is not a medically
accepted indication.”260 A “medically accepted indication” is deﬁned as “any use for a covered outpatient
drug which is approved under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or the use of which is supported
by” one of speciﬁed compendia.261 There is a narrow exception that allows for payment for certain drugs
that are not otherwise covered where the drugs have been determined to be “essential to the health of the
beneﬁciaries.”262
IV.
FCA Liability for Manufacturer Promotion of Oﬀ-Label Uses?
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis
On August 13, 1996, David Franklin, as relator, ﬁled a nine-count qui tam action in United States ex rel.
prescription drug beneﬁt include: prior authorization of at least some prescription drugs; fail-ﬁrst/step therapy (a particular
drug is not dispensed unless it has been determined that another drug has been tried and is inappropriate for the patient);
excluded drugs (Medicaid laws allow states to exclude certain categories of drugs from coverage, e.g. drugs with high potential
for abuse or drugs used for cosmetic purposes); preferred drug lists (PDLs); supplemental rebates; generics; quantity limits;
and cost-sharing.
26042 U.S.C. §1396r-8(k)(3).
26142 U.S.C. §1396r-8(k)(6), see also 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) for speciﬁed compendia, including American Hospital
Formulary Service Drug Information, United States Pharmacopeia-Drug Information, and the DRUGDEX Information System.
26242 U.S.C. §1396r-8(a)(3).
42Franklin v. Parke-Davis.263 Franklin (also “Relator”) holds a doctorate in biology, is accomplished in the
medical ﬁeld, and was employed by the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer, Parke-Davis, as a “medical
liaison” for ﬁve months during 1996.264 Franklin alleged that Parke-Davis “engaged in an extensive and
far-reaching campaign to use false statements to promote increased prescriptions of Neurontin and Accupril
for oﬀ-label uses which caused the ﬁling of false claims for reimbursement by the federal government.”265
Neutrontin was approved by the FDA in 1994 for use as an adjunctive treatment for epilepsy.266 It is also
used for a number of oﬀ-label purposes, including pain control, as mono-therapy for epilepsy, for control of
bipolar disease, and as treatment for attention deﬁcit disorder.267 Franklin claimed that 50% of Neurontin’s
sales in 1996 were attributable to oﬀ-label uses and that, of those sales, 50% “were reimbursed by the govern-
ment either indirectly through Medicaid or directly through purchases by the Veterans Administration.”268
Accupril is an ACE inhibitor that has been by the FDA for control of hypertension and as a treatment for
heart failure.269
Franklin alleged that he was hired by Parke-Davis as a “medical liaison” and was “instructed to make ex-
aggerated or false claims concerning the safety and eﬃcacy of Parke-Davis drugs for oﬀ-label uses.”270 In
addition, Franklin claimed that he was trained to represent that Neurontin could be prescribed for its various
oﬀ-label uses in amounts of up to 4800 mg per day although the drug was only FDA-approved for a maximum
dosage of 1800 mg per day.271 Franklin furthermore claimed that medical liaisons were “encouraged to mis-
represent their scientiﬁc credentials and to pose as research personnel rather than as sales representatives,”
263United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
264Id. at 44. Franklin “has co-authored ﬁve scientiﬁc publications, is an author of a pending patent application, and received
a two-year research fellowship with Harvard Medical School and the Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston in 1992.” Id.
At the time the relator ﬁled the complaint, Parke-Davis was a division of Warner-Lambert Company; Warner-Lambert was
subsequently acquired by Pﬁzer, Inc. in June 2000. Id. at n.2.
265Id. at 45.
266Id.
267Id.
268Id.
269Id.
270Id.
271Id.
43despite the fact that medical liaisons had no connection to Parke-Davis’ research division.272 According to
Franklin, when questions were raised regarding the availability of reimbursement for oﬀ-label prescriptions
of Parke-Davis drugs, medical liaisons “were instructed to coach doctors on how to conceal the oﬀ-label
nature of the prescription.”273 Franklin claimed that Parke-Davis shredded documents, falsiﬁed documents,
and encouraged medical liaisons not to leave a “paper trail” that could be followed by the FDA, in order to
conceal its promotion of oﬀ-label uses for its drugs from the FDA.274
In addition, Franklin made claims relating to potential violations of the Medicaid Antikickback Provision.
He alleged that doctors were rewarded with various forms of compensation for prescribing large quantities
of Parke-Davis drugs. 275 These kickbacks included various monetary payments disguised as compensation
for other things such as drug studies which had no scientiﬁc value and physicians’ services as “consultants”
or “preceptors” or for participating in a “speakers bureau.”276 Physicians also reportedly received “cash
payments for small record-keeping tasks, such as allowing Parke-Davis access to information about the
doctors’ patients who were receiving Neurontin.”277 Finally, Franklin alleged that doctors who prescribed
“large amounts of Parke-Davis drugs were given gifts such as travel and tickets to the Olympics.”278
After Franklin ﬁled his complaint, the case remained under seal for several years while the government
contemplated intervening.279 To date, the government is participating only as an “amicus curiae while
272Id.
273Id. at 46.
274Id.
275Id.
276Id.
277Id.
278Id.
279Id.
44reserving its right to intervene as plaintiﬀ at a later point,” and has ﬁled a Statement of Interest.280 The
seal on the complaint was lifted on December 21, 1999, at which point litigation on the case began.281
Motion to Dismiss Decision
Parke-Davis moved for dismissal of Franklin’s qui tam allegations, claiming he had failed to plead a claim
of fraud with particularity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).282 The federal district court for the District of
Massachusetts issued its opinion on the motion to dismiss on June 25, 2001, granting the motion in part
and denying the motion in part.283 The court noted that qui tam actions under the FCA must comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s requirement that “the circumstances constituting fraud...shall be stated with
particularity,” and found that Franklin had not suﬃciently pled fraud with particularity as to Parke-Davis’
promotion of oﬀ-label uses of Neurontin in direct sales to the Veterans’ Administration, nor as to Parke-
Davis’ promotion of oﬀ-label sales of Accupril.284 The court thus dismissed those claims, and also dismissed
Franklin’s claims of violations of the Medicaid Antikickback provision as well as further claims that Parke-
Davis “engaged doctors to perform clinical trials using Parke-Davis drugs in violations of FDA regulations
requiring that the drugs for such trials be provided at no cost.”285
However, the court found that Franklin had suﬃciently pleaded fraud with particularity and stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted in alleging Parke-Davis’ promotion of oﬀ-label uses of Neurontin for
Medicaid reimbursement and the resulting FCA claims.286 As to the motion to dismiss for failure to plead
fraud with particularity, the court stated that:
280Id.; United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. 96-11651, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *1 (D.Mass. Aug. 22, 2003).
281Id.
282Id. at 43-44.
283Id. at 44.
284Id. at 46, 49-50.
285Id. at 55.
286Id. at 49, 53.
45although Relator’s complaint alleges a general framework of what might be actionable FCA
claims, those allegations standing alone lack the speciﬁcity required under Rule 9(b). The
complaint does not disclose the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud.287
The court found it appropriate, however, to look to the Franklin’s disclosure to the government pursuant to
section 3730(b)(2) of the FCA, because the disclosure was referenced in the complaint.288 Taking the dis-
closure into consideration, the court found that Franklin’s complaint contained allegations of fraud suﬃcient
to satisfy Rule 9(b).289 The disclosure described a scheme designed to increase the submission of oﬀ-label
prescriptions for Neurontin, including false statements made to physicians to induce oﬀ-label prescriptions
for Neurontin, identifying individuals at Parke-Davis involved in the scheme and the physicians contacted by
name.290 The disclosure also described a “fraudulent marketing campaign conducted by Parke-Davis in
which...unlawful and misleading marketing [was] allegedly used to encourage doctors to increase their use of
Neurontin for unapproved purposes.”291 In the disclosure, Franklin cited at least eleven speciﬁc examples of
fraudulent statements that medical liaisons were trained to and did give to physicians to induce the purchase
of Neurontin for oﬀ-label uses.292 These false statements included:
•
Franklin himself “deliberately contrived reports to mislead physicians into believing that a
body of data existed that demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of Neurontin in the treatment of bipolar
disease,” although no data in fact existed to support this use;293
•
Franklin was trained and instructed to use falsiﬁed “leaks” from clinical trials, scientiﬁcally
ﬂawed reports, or success stories stating that Neurontin was highly eﬀective in treating a variety of
pain syndromes, although no such body of evidence of existed;294
288Id.
289Id. at 48.
290Id.
291Id.
292Id.
46•
Franklin was instructed to advise physicians that Parke-Davis had developed a large body
of data to support the use of Neurontin as mono-therapy although this was an “outright lie” and
left patients unknowingly without good seizure control;295
•
Medical liaisons were instructed to tell physicians a great deal of data existed that supported
the safe use of Neurontin at levels exceeding 4800 mg per day although clinically signiﬁcant safety
data only existed at dosing levels of 1800 mg per day; and 296
•
Parke-Davis provided medical liaisons with slides stating that Neurontin was eﬀective in
treating Attention Deﬁcit Disorders although no data existed to support the claim;297
The district court thus found that the allegations in the complaint and disclosure suﬃciently pled fraud with
particularity, and that Franklin did not have to identify each false claim, as the defendant argued, given the
complexity and scope of the alleged scheme of fraud.298 The court found that this expectation would be
unreasonable as Franklin did not have pre-discovery access to the patient-speciﬁc information required to
plead fraud with such speciﬁcity.299
In addition to ﬁnding that Franklin suﬃciently pled fraud with particularity as to Parke-Davis’ promotion
of Neurontin for oﬀ-label uses, the district court also determined that although Franklin’s complaint “takes
the parties into territory that is not well charted by the existing decisional law,” it suﬃciently stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted and should thus survive Parke-Davis’ motion to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).300 The court set forth the requirements for bringing an FCA action – “(1)...a false
statement or fraudulent course of conduct; (2) made or carried out with the requisite scienter; (3) that was
material; and (4) that caused the government to pay out money or to forfeit moneys due...” and noted
298Id.
299Id.
300Id. at 53.
47that the Supreme Court has indicated that the “False Claims Act is intended to reach all types of fraud,
without qualiﬁcation, that might result in ﬁnancial loss to the Government.301 Parke-Davis did not dispute
that oﬀ-label prescriptions submitted for Medicaid reimbursement are false claims within the meaning of
the FCA, but rather attacked “the viability of a claim under the FCA against a manufacturer that did not
itself submit false claims in the form of oﬀ-label prescriptions directly to the government.”302 The court
therefore focused on the four elements of Parke-Davis’ attack on Franklin’s theory of FCA liability, rejecting
each argument in turn.
First, Parke-Davis argued that allowing Franklin to use the FCA to enforce the FD&C Act would create
a cause of action for money damages under the Act, and thus circumvent its enforcement provisions by
providing the FDA with a tool not prescribed in the Act itself.303 In considering this argument, the court
acknowledged that the FCA “cannot be used to enforce compliance with every federal law or regulation.”304
However, the FCA “can be used to create liability where failure to abide by a rule or regulation amounts
to a material misrepresentation made to obtain a government beneﬁt.”305 Thus, taking the allegations of
Franklin’s complaint as true, the court found that the fact that Congress did not “provide a cause of action
for money damages against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for marketing oﬀ-label drugs does not preclude
an FCA claim where the manufacturer has knowingly caused a false statement to be made to get a false
claim paid or approved by the government.”306
301Id. at 50 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 788 (4th Cir. 1999)).
302Id. at 51.
303Id. The court noted that the FD&C Act only allows the FDA to enforce the oﬀ-label marketing ban through seizures,
injunctions, and criminal proceedings, but does not provide for civil damage remedies. Id.
304Id.
305Id.
306Id. at 52.
48Second, Parke-Davis argued that oﬀ-label promotion does not necessarily include a false statement or fraud-
ulent conduct, as in the case of a technical violation of the oﬀ-label marketing bans.307 The court found
this argument inapplicable to Franklin’s complaint, however, because Parke-Davis’ alleged FCA violation
was not based on the oﬀ-label marketing activity itself but rather on the manufacturer’s “course of fraud-
ulent conduct including knowingly making false statements to doctors that caused them to submit claims
that were not eligible for payment by the government under Medicaid.”308 The court acknowledged that a
more diﬃcult question would exist if Franklin had only alleged unlawful, but truthful, oﬀ-label promotion
of Neurontin.309
Third, Parke-Davis claimed that Franklin’s allegations could not meet the FCA’s causation requirement
because the independent actions of the physicians who wrote the oﬀ-label prescriptions and the pharmacists
who accepted and ﬁlled the oﬀ-label prescriptions broke the chain of legal causation.310 The district court
rejected this argument as well, noting that as a matter of law an intervening force only breaks a causal
connection if it is unforeseeable. 311 Here, however, “the participation of doctors and pharmacists in the
submission of false Medicaid claims was not only foreseeable, it was an intended consequence of the alleged
scheme of fraud.”312
Finally, the district court rejected Parke-Davis’ argument that Franklin had not alleged that false statements
made by the manufacturer were material to the government’s decision to pay the claims for oﬀ-label Neu-
rontin prescriptions.313 The court found that the fact that the prescriptions were for an oﬀ-label use was
307Id.
308Id.
309Id.
310Id.
311Id.
312Id. at 52-53.
313Id. at 53.
49material because “the government would not have paid the claims if it had known the use for which they were
being submitted.”314 Thus, Franklin had suﬃciently alleged that Parke-Davis “caused-to-be-presented” false
claims through a fraudulent course of conduct in violation of section 3729(a), given the expansive statutory
language of the FCA and the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal “’to accept a rigid, restrictive reading’ of
the FCA.”315
The district court thus dismissed each of Parke-Davis’ arguments against Franklin’s theory of FCA liability
and allowed his qui tam suit to proceed. In doing so, the court accepted that Franklin’s particular allegations
might present an appropriate claim for an FCA violation, that is a manufacturer may violate the FCA by
engaging in a fraudulent course of conduct designed to induce doctors to prescribe an FDA-approved drug
for an oﬀ-label use, knowing that these prescriptions would result in the submission of claims to the federal
government for Medicaid reimbursement.
Motion for Summary Judgment Decision
Parke-Davis again challenged Franklin’s allegations and theory of FCA liability with a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court denied on August 22, 2003.316 In this motion, Parke-Davis argued
that Franklin had to prove “that Parke-Davis intentionally made a material false statement that led to the
ﬁling of a false claim” in order to claim liability under the FCA.317 Parke-Davis thus interpreted the FCA as
containing a “double falsehood requirement: An FCA plaintiﬀ must prove a false statement that led to a false
claim,” and argued that Franklin had not shown that Parke-Davis made any material false statements.318
The district court rejected this legal argument as inconsistent with the text of the FCA, clarifying that while
section 3729(a)(2) of the FCA contains a double-falsehood requirement, only one falsehood is required under
314Id.
315Id. (citing United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232-33 (1968)).
316United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *1.
317Id. at *3.
318Id.
50section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA.319
The court thus found that Franklin was “not required to present evidence that Parke-Davis lied to physicians
about Neurontin’s oﬀ-label eﬃcacy or safety to induce them to prescribe Neurontin for uses ineligible under
Medicaid” because his FCA claim was not limited to section 3729(a)(2). 320 Acknowledging that its opinion
on Parke-Davis’ motion to dismiss focused on allegations of false statements under section 3729(a)(2), the
district court went on to determine that under section 3729(a)(1) “the only issue is whether Parke-Davis
‘caused to be presented’ a false claim, and section 3729 does not require that the ‘cause’ be fraudulent or
otherwise independently unlawful.”321
The district court then addressed Parke-Davis’ attack on Franklin’s claim that an oﬀ-label prescription
submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a false claim within the meaning of the FCA, which Parke-
Davis had previously not disputed.322 Parke-Davis argued that forty-two states’ Medicaid programs “permit
reimbursement for oﬀ-label, non-compendium drug prescriptions, and that therefore claims for Medicaid
reimbursement for oﬀ-label Neurontin prescriptions in those states were not false claims.”323 In contrast,
Franklin argued that the Medicaid statute did not authorize states to provide such broad coverage, but
instead only gave the states discretion within the category of “covered outpatient drugs.”324 The district
319Id. Section 3729(a)(2) creates liability for anyone who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the government.” Section 3729(a)(1), however, provides for
liability where a defendant “knowingly presents or causes to be presented...a false or fraudulent claim.” Id. The district court
cited precedent establishing that liability under section 3729(a)(1) does not require the additional element of an express false
statement, as required for liability under section 3729(a)(2). Id. (citing Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519,
531 (10th Cir. 2000) and United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 921 F. Supp. 611, 627 (W.D. Wis. 1995)).
320United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *4.
321Id. at *5.
322Id. at *6.
323Id. at *7. Parke-Davis claimed that under 42 U.S.C. §1396r-(8)(d)(1)(B), “states have the option not to exclude coverage
for drugs for which the prescribed use is not for a medically accepted indication.” Id.
324Id. at *7-8. The court considered Franklin’s interpretation unlikely because it made subsection 1396r-(8)(d)(1)(B)(i)
superﬂuous, in violation of basic rules of statutory construction. Id. at *8.
51court found this debate to be immaterial however, because Parke-Davis conceded “that eight states do not
provide reimbursement for oﬀ-label drug prescriptions not included in a medical compendium,” and in those
states, such a Medicaid reimbursement request would therefore be a false claim.325 Parke-Davis’ argument
thus pertained to the amount of damages, rather than to Franklin’s ability to demonstrate a false claim, and
the court declined to consider damages at the summary judgment stage.326
Parke-Davis raised a further factual argument in its motion for summary judgment, claiming that because
the Medicaid reimbursement claim forms for prescription drugs do not require the claimant to list the use
for which the drug is being prescribed, Franklin could not show that any Medicaid claims sought reimburse-
ment for oﬀ-label uses.327 The district court rejected this argument, however, ﬁnding that Franklin had
provided suﬃcient analysis “linking patients’ treatment histories to Neurontin prescriptions that generated
reimbursement claims” to survive summary judgment.328
Parke-Davis again attacked Franklin’s ability to demonstrate the requisite causal connection between Parke-
Davis’ actions and the false claims at issue, claiming that Franklin could not show that Parke-Davis “either
exerted ‘control over’ or otherwise directly inﬂuenced, the submission of a false claim” because of the role of
doctors, patients, and pharmacists in the submission of Medicaid reimbursement claims.329 In considering
this claim, the district court applied common law tort causation concepts, which would require Franklin
to show both (1) that Parke-Davis’ conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing the presentation of false
Medicaid claims, and (2) that Parke-Davis could have foreseen false Medicaid claims being ﬁled.330 The
court found that the ﬁrst requirement was a question of fact, as to which Franklin had produced enough
evidence to survive summary judgment.331 As to the foreseeability requirement, the district court reiterated
325Id. at *9-10.
326Id. at *10.
327Id.
328Id. at *10-11.
329Id. at *11.
330Id. at *12-13.
331Id. at *13.
52that it had already held that Parke-Davis could have foreseen false Medicaid claims being ﬁled in its motion
to dismiss opinion, and further stated that Franklin had “provided evidence that Parke-Davis’ actions were
not irrelevant, but rather played a key role in setting in motion a chain of events that led to false claims.”332
Finally, the district court addressed the government’s argument that “Parke-Davis’ alleged violation of the
Medicaid Antikickback provision caused false claims, because Medicaid claimants impliedly certify that their
claims have not been tainted by kickbacks.”333 While the court found the government’s argument persua-
sive, it declined to revive Franklin’s claim of Antikickback violations because the government was still not a
party to the suit.334 Instead, the court indicated that evidence of kickbacks could be relevant to Franklin’s
allegations that Parke-Davis violated section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA by “causing-to-be-presented” claims for
reimbursement for oﬀ-label prescriptions that were ineligible for coverage under Medicaid.
Legal Theories Underscoring Franklin v. Parke-Davis
Franklin’s FCA claim presented an unprecedented legal theory – an attempt to hold a pharmaceutical
manufacturer liable to the US government for moneys paid out to reimburse Medicaid claims because the
manufacturer’s promotion resulted in those claims being improperly ﬁled. In denying Parke-Davis’ motion to
dismiss and motion for summary judgment, the District of Massachusetts indicated that this novel attempt
may be a valid one, given the particular facts alleged in Franklin’s complaint. At the motion to dismiss
stage, the court’s acceptance of Franklin’s theory seemed to turn on his allegations of false statements and
fraudulent conduct on the part of Parke-Davis in promoting oﬀ-label uses of Neurontin.335 However, the
district court’s summary judgment opinion gave potential support to a broader theory of liability under
332Id. at *13, 16.
333Id. at *19.
334Id. at *20.
335United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
53section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA when it stated that “the only issue [was] whether Parke-Davis ‘caused to be
presented’ a false claim, and §3729 does not require that the ‘cause’ be fraudulent or otherwise independently
unlawful.”336 The court thus indicated that a manufacturer may violate section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA by
promoting an FDA-approved drug for oﬀ-label use, even if such promotion is truthful, if it knows that
the promotion will foreseeably result in the submission of claims for Medicaid reimbursement that are not
reimbursable under the Medicaid statute because they are not for a medically accepted indication.
Assessing whether this unprecedented legal theory is, in fact, sound requires considering the intersection of
the two subjects previously addressed – the FDA’s approach to oﬀ-label uses of prescription drugs and the
purposes and requirements of the FCA – to determine whether and how the alleged conduct satisﬁes the
required elements of an FCA claim. While the district court in Franklin v. Parke-Davis found Franklin’s
legal theory to be valid given the speciﬁc facts he alleged, the validity of such a claim may not be as deﬁnite in
other factual scenarios. A plaintiﬀ in a future case alleging FCA liability based on manufacturer promotion of
oﬀ-label uses might have a harder time demonstrating, as required, that: “(1) the ‘person’; (2) ‘present[ed]’
or ‘cause[d] to be presented’; (3) ‘a false or fraudulent’; (4) ‘claim,’ ‘record or statement’; (5) ‘knowingly’; (6)
to ‘the United States [government]’; that was (7) ‘material’ to the government’s determination to pay.”337
Thus, considering some of the diﬃcult questions involved with this legal theory is important to understanding
its potential future impact. Decisions in future cases attempting to extend Franklin’s theory of FCA liability
will likely raise a number of legal questions – speciﬁcally, is a pharmaceutical manufacturer an appropriate
defendant in a suit based on false claims submitted for Medicaid reimbursement? Furthermore, are claims
submitted for Medicaid reimbursement of prescriptions for oﬀ-label indications actually false or fraudulent?
336United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *6.
337Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 117-18.
54Finally, even if a plaintiﬀ’s allegations actually meet the requisite elements for an FCA claim, is the FCA
an appropriate tool for the prevention of manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses of FDA-approved drugs?
Manufacturer Cause-to-be-Presented Liability
An initial question may seem to exist as to whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer is appropriate defendant
in an FCA action based on improper reimbursement of Medicaid claims for oﬀ-label prescriptions given the
fact that the manufacturer did not actually submit the claims for reimbursement. However, if a qui tam
plaintiﬀ is able to prove the requisite level of scienter for an FCA claim on the part of the manufacturer,
the manufacturer is a proper defendant to such an action because of the “cause-to-be-presented liability”
provided for in section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA.338 Such liability is widely accepted in FCA jurisprudence,
and normally applies “where the person responsible for the falsity does not actually submit the claim, but
rather directs others (who may not know of the falsity) to submit the claim on his or her behalf.339
In the scenario involved in Franklin v. Parke-Davis, the chain of events that leads to the payment of a false
claim for Medicaid reimbursement involves several links: a manufacturer markets a drug to doctors, who
prescribe it for their patients, who take the prescriptions to their pharmacists, who ﬁle claims for Medicaid
reimbursement.340 The potential FCA liability of each of these parties involved in submitting the false claim
is tied to their individual scienter rather than to their proximity to the actual submission in the chain of
causation. The FCA deﬁnes “knowingly” to mean that a party “(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard
33831 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1).
339Krause, supra note 112, at 140.
340United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *11.
55of the truth or falsity of the information.”341 In the Franklin v. Parke-Davis scenario, to act “knowingly”
a defendant would have to be aware that a submitted claim was not properly reimbursable under Medicaid
because it was not for a medially accepted indication, act in deliberate ignorance of this information, or act
with reckless disregard for this information.342 If a plaintiﬀ were unable to prove this level of scienter as to
an individual defendant, the defendant could not be liable under the FCA.343
A plaintiﬀ’s ability to prove scienter as to an individual defendant in the Franklin v. Parke-Davis scenario
will likely be a very fact-intensive inquiry. The patient who submits the prescription to be ﬁlled might not
know if s/he is prescribed a drug for an unapproved use and probably is not aware of the technicalities of
the Medicaid laws. The pharmacist might act with the requisite scienter if s/he is aware that a particular
unapproved use is not reimbursable under Medicaid, and knows the patient well enough to determine whether
the particular prescription was for an approved or unapproved use. Thus, although both the patient and
the pharmacist are closely linked in the chain of causation to the actual submission of the false claim for
reimbursement, they may not have acted with the scienter required for FCA liability. And, although their
relation to the submission of the false claim is more tenuous, either physicians or manufacturers might be
shown to have acted with the requisite scienter because they would be aware of a drug’s approved and
unapproved uses and of the requirements for reimbursement under the Medicaid laws. The physician or
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s liability would turn on whether the plaintiﬀ could show that the potential
defendant knew the claim would be submitted for Medicaid reimbursement.
If the plaintiﬀ could demonstrate the requisite scienter as to either the physician or the pharmaceutical
manufacturer, those parties could only be liable through §3729(a)(1)’s special provision for “cause-to-be-
presented” liability because of the attenuated nature of their relationship to the actual submission of the
34131 U.S.C. §3729(b).
342Id.
343Id.
56false claim for Medicaid reimbursement. In order to rely on “cause-to-be-presented” liability, a plaintiﬀ will
likely have to show that the manufacturer directed or authorized the submission of the improper claim for
Medicaid reimbursement.344 If the plaintiﬀ can only show that the manufacturer ‘knew’ that the claims
would be improperly submitted for Medicaid reimbursement but did not actually direct the submission, a
court may not ﬁnd that “cause-to-be-presented” liability is proper.345 In Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Franklin
alleged that:
when questions arose concerning the availability of reimbursement for prescriptions for oﬀ-
label uses of Parke-Davis drugs, medical liaisons were instructed to coach doctors on how to
conceal the oﬀ-label nature of the prescription. Relator also alleges that Parke-Davis took
numerous actions to conceal its activities from the FDA, including shredding documents,
falsifying documents, and encouraging medical liaisons to conduct their marketing activities
without leaving a “paper trail” that might be discovered by the FDA.346
These allegations, if supported by evidence, are probably crucial to Franklin’s ability to support “cause-
to-be-presented” liability on the part of Parke-Davis because they indicate that Parke-Davis directed the
submission of false claims.347 However, if a plaintiﬀ were unable to show that a drug manufacturer engaged
in similar activities, s/he might not be able to recover based on “cause-to-be-presented” liability.348
Future plaintiﬀs’ ability to demonstrate FCA liability on the part of drug manufacturers based on “cause-to-
be-presented” liability may have drastic impacts on drug manufacturers’ promotional activities. The policy
implications of the potential impacts are discussed in Part V below, but at this point it is worth noting that
manufacturers may attempt to ﬁnd means of limiting their FCA liability. For instance, if a manufacturer
includes a disclaimer about Medicaid reimbursability in a drug’s package insert, patients will likely have
a harder time demonstrating that the manufacturer acted “knowingly” or directed the submission of false
344Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 117, n.31.
345Id. (citing United States ex rel. Shaver v. Lucas Western Corp., 237 F.3d 932, 933 (8th Cir. 2001)).
347Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 117, n.31.
348Id.
57claims, as required by the FCA.349
The Falsity of Claims Submitted for Medicaid Reimbursement
Liability under the FCA clearly requires that the claims submitted to the government for payment are ‘false’
or ‘fraudulent,’ which begs the question of whether claims submitted for Medicaid reimbursement of oﬀ-label
prescriptions are actually ‘false’ or ‘fraudulent.’350 At the motion to dismiss stage in Franklin v. Parke-
Davis, the parties did not dispute that oﬀ-label prescriptions submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid are
false claims within the meaning of the FCA.351 Later, at the summary judgment stage, Parke-Davis raised
an argument that such claims were not actually false because of the discretion permitted in states by the
Medicaid statute to provide reimbursement for oﬀ-label, non-compendium drug prescriptions.352 The district
court rejected this argument, pointing to the fact that in eight states there is no discretion for reimbursement
for oﬀ-label prescriptions not included in a medical compendium such that Medicaid reimbursement requests
for oﬀ-label, non-compendium prescriptions in those states constitute false claims.353
The district court in Franklin v. Parke-Davis has thus far accepted that claims Medicaid reimbursement
of oﬀ-label prescriptions may constitute false claims, and based on the court’s opinions, some literature
has accepted that although such claims are infrequent, they may actually be false within the meaning of
the FCA.354 In particular, Joel M. Androphy and Mark A. Correro have posited that “if a governmental
Medicaid or Medicaid program pays for...non-approved uses, a false claim arises.”355 In support of this
34931 U.S.C. §3729(b); Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 117, n.31.
35031 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1).
351United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
352United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *7.
353Id.
354Krause, supra note 110,.at 1390; Androphy & Correro, supra note 120, at 43-45.
355Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 43.
58statement, Androphy and Carrero theorize that if a manufacturer disseminates information on oﬀ-label
uses in a manner that does not meet the requirements of the FDAMA, a drug is misbranded because it
is accompanied by literature concerning unapproved uses, and the manufacturer promotion of the oﬀ-label
use is impermissible under the FD&C Act.356 This explanation ignores the signiﬁcant First Amendment
implications of manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses, discussed above. Furthermore, Androphy and
Carrero’s explanation seems to confuse two separate issues involved in determining whether such claims are
indeed false – the FDA prohibition on manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses and the technicalities of
what constitutes a properly reimbursable claim under the Medicaid laws.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has stated that “the False Claims Act was not designed to reach
every kind of fraud practiced on the Government;”357 however, “now, with only a few exceptions, most
conduct that illegally increases payment by the government of revenues to which it is entitled, has been held
(correctly or not) to trigger FCA liability.”358 Given the expansive interpretation of “false” that most courts
currently apply in FCA cases, the district court correctly accepted Franklin’s argument at summary judgment
that claims for oﬀ-label prescriptions submitted for Medicaid reimbursement, at least in those states where
there is no discretion to reimburse oﬀ-label, non-compendium uses, are indeed false.359 Such claims are
false because they induce the government to reimburse for prescriptions not properly reimbursable under
the Medicaid statute, in the same way that claims are false when health care providers perform unnecessary
medical services and seek reimbursement for them by certifying that they were medically necessary.360 By
“causing-to-be-presented” claims that should not rightly be reimbursed under the Medicaid statutes of at
356Id. at 44.
357United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958).
358Boese, supra note 165, at §2, 2-5 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d at 788).
359Androphy & Carrero, supra note 120, at 37; United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754
at *7.
360Bucy, supra note 149, at 81.
59least 8 states, manufacturers may have violated the FCA by leading the government to pay out money
improperly.
Androphy and Carrero’s argument that claims for Medicaid reimbursement of oﬀ-label prescriptions are false
simply because the manufacturer is prohibited from promoting the oﬀ-label use under the FD&C Act seems
less straightforward. As discussed in Part I above, the FDA does take the approach that manufacturer promo-
tion of oﬀ-label use can violate both the misbranding and the new drug approval requirements of the FD&C
Act.361 In addition, FDA regulations speciﬁcally prohibit manufacturers from advertising oﬀ-label uses of
their approved products.362 However, the FDA’s current approach to enforcement, reﬂected in Washington
Legal Foundation v. Henney and the FDA’s Final Guidance for Industry on CME, is that a manufacturer’s
noncompliance with the FDAMA or CME Guidance safe harbors does not, by itself, constitute a violation
of the FD&C Act, although such noncompliance may be used as evidence in a misbranding or “intended
use” enforcement action. 363 Furthermore, based on the district court decision in Washington Legal Founda-
tion v. Henney that addresses the First Amendment implications of the FDAMA and the CME Guidance,
FDA would likely have diﬃculty asserting that either of those sources provided an independent ground for
enforcement because neither meets the Central Hudson test for constitutionally permissible restrictions on
commercial speech.364
Androphy and Carrero may thus be incorrect that a manufacturer who promotes an oﬀ-label use of an
approved drug inherently breaks the law. Furthermore, even if a manufacturer’s conduct violates the FD&C
Act, such conduct does not necessarily lead to a false claim for purposes of the FCA if it does not result in
361Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,075-76.
36221 C.F.R. §202.1(e)(4)(i)(a).
363WLF v. Henney, 202 F.3d at 335-36.
364WLF v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
60the submission of a claim for Medicaid reimbursement that is not properly reimbursable under the statute.
As Parke-Davis argued and the district court acknowledged at the summary judgment stage, the Medicaid
programs of forty-two states allow for discretion to reimburse for oﬀ-label, non-compendium uses.365 In
those states, a manufacturer may promote a drug for an oﬀ-label use in violation of the FD&C Act, and that
promotion may result in the submission of claims for Medicaid reimbursement for prescriptions; however,
if the state Medicaid program allows discretion to reimburse the claim regardless of its oﬀ-label nature, no
false claim exists.
In the eight states where Medicaid programs do not allow for such discretion, submissions of claims for
Medicaid reimbursement for oﬀ-label uses may potentially constitute false claims under the FCA.366 A
manufacturer who promoted a drug for an oﬀ-label use, knowing that it would result in an improper claim
for Medicaid reimbursement might thus be held liable under the FCA in one of those states. However,
in defending against such liability, the drug manufacturer might argue that its promotional behavior was
protected by the First Amendment. Thus, a court ruling on an allegation of FCA liability on the part of a
drug manufacturer for promoting oﬀ-label uses that resulted in improper claims for Medicaid reimbursement
would be forced to balance the competing policies underlying the FCA and the First Amendment.
The FCA as a Tool For Enforcing the FD&C Act
The situation described above, where a manufacturer may violate the FD&C Act by promoting a drug for
an oﬀ-label use but where that promotion does not result in the submission of a false claim for Medicaid
reimbursement, raises the issue of whether the FCA is an appropriate tool for enforcing the FD&C Act.
365United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *7.
366Id.
61The FD&C Act provides the government with a number of enforcement remedies – administrative seizures,
injunctions, and criminal proceedings – but does not provide the FDA with a civil damage remedy for viola-
tions.367 Policing FD&C Act violations through the FCA would thus allow for an otherwise unavailable civil
damage remedy. However, courts have widely acknowledged that, “violations of laws, rules, or regulations
alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA.”368 Instead, liability arises under the FCA where “fail-
ure to abide by a rule or regulation amounts to a material misrepresentation made to obtain a government
beneﬁt.”369
The district court in Franklin v. Parke-Davis rejected Parke-Davis’ argument that Franklin’s claim was an
inappropriate end-run around the FD&C Act enforcement provisions, stating:
The failure of Congress to provide a cause of action for money damages against a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer for marketing oﬀ-label drugs does not preclude an FCA claim where
the manufacturer has knowingly caused a false statement to be made to get a false claim
paid or approved by the government in violation of 31 U.S.C. §3729(a).370
Thus, in the Franklin v. Parke-Davis scenario, Parke-Davis’ allegedly fraudulent conduct “caused-to-be-
presented” false claims for Medicaid reimbursement, giving rise to FCA liability. Hypothetically, however,
a manufacturer may actually violate the FD&C Act by promoting a drug for an oﬀ-label use, but this
promotion may not necessarily result in a technically false claim, perhaps because of the discretion in a
state’s Medicaid program. In such a case, the manufacturer’s violation of the FD&C Act, in and of itself,
would likely be insuﬃcient to constitute a violation of the FCA.371 Given courts’ caution that, “the FCA is
36721 U.S.C. §§332 (a), 333(a).
368United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1996).
369United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
371See e.g. United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402, 416 (3d. Cir. 1999) (“Not every regulatory
violations is tantamount to making a knowingly false statement to the government.”).
62not an appropriate vehicle for policing technical compliance with administrative regulations,”372 an FD&C
Act violation that does not result in a false claim could be viewed as the type of regulatory violation that does
not inherently give rise to FCA liability.373 In that situation, Congress’ failure to provide for civil monetary
penalties for FD&C Act violations could provide further evidence that the FCA was an inappropriate tool
for enforcing such violations.374
Using the FCA as a means of enforcing the FD&C Act may also be inappropriate in situations where the
reimbursement of claims for oﬀ-label uses has no impact on the public treasury. Joan H. Krause argues that
the concept of “harm to the public ﬁsc” should guide the application of the FCA to the health care industry in
order to cloak it with legitimacy.375 She posits that the concept of “harm to the public ﬁsc” provides not
only a method of calculating damages and the extent of a defendant’s liability, but also a means of deciding
whether a case merits use of the FCA at all.376 As discussed above, there are many hypothetical situations
in which a manufacturer may violate the FD&C Act by improperly promoting oﬀ-label prescriptions of an
approved drug but this promotion does not result in any government expenditure or direct harm to the public
treasury. For instance, when an oﬀ-label prescription is written for a patient covered by private insurance,
the manufacturer’s underlying conduct may violate the FD&C Act, but no government expenditure results
and FCA liability for the manufacturer is thus clearly inappropriate. This logic may apply as well in the
scenario raised in Franklin v. Parke-Davis, where claims are submitted for Medicaid reimbursement in a
state that allows discretion in covering oﬀ-label, non-compendium uses. In that situation, the lack of harm
372United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 1999).
373Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.2d at 1266-67.
37421 U.S.C. §§332(a), 333(a).
375Krause, supra note 112, at 126-27. Krause uses the term “public ﬁsc” to refer to the public treasury.
376Id. at 126.
63to the public treasury may provide further evidence that the FCA is an inappropriate enforcement tool.377
V.
Policy Implications of United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis
In addition to presenting a novel legal claim, Franklin v. Parke-Davis raises potential policy implications.
First, a decision holding the manufacturer liable under the FCA could have a disparate impact on Medicaid
beneﬁciaries as opposed to privately insured individuals, which might be important in light of the Medicare
Prescription Drug Beneﬁt that will go into eﬀect in 2006. Next, the decision in Franklin v. Parke-Davis may
have an eﬀect on manufacturer’s willingness to disseminate information about oﬀ-label uses, even pursuant
to the FDAMA or the CME Guidance, which in turn would impact physicians’ ability to provide optimal
medical care to patients. Finally, Franklin v. Parke-Davis highlights the clash between FDA policy on
manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses and the First Amendment because manufacturers may seek to
assert First Amendment defenses to suits under the FCA.
Disparate Impact on Medicaid Beneﬁciaries
If Franklin v. Parke-Davis successfully establishes the manufacturer’s liability under the FCA for its promo-
tion of oﬀ-label uses of prescription drugs, the decision could potentially have a negative eﬀect on Medicaid
beneﬁciaries’ ability to gain access to such oﬀ-label prescriptions. This eﬀect might be particularly trouble-
some, given that oﬀ-label prescriptions are most often used in oncology and in pediatrics, areas of medicine
that may require more cutting-edge treatments.378
377Id.
378WLF v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
64A decision that the manufacturer is liable under the FCA for promotion of oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs
that results in the submission of claims for Medicaid reimbursement could send a message to the drug manu-
facturers that they should limit such promotion if Medicaid claims may result. Drug manufacturers, seeking
to limit their liability, could therefore decline to provide information on oﬀ-label uses to physicians whom
they know to extensively treat Medicaid patients. Disseminations of information by drug manufacturers via
enduring materials and CME seminars permitted under the FDAMA and the CME Guidance provide a great
deal of the necessary information available to physicians on oﬀ-label uses.379 Thus, if drug manufacturers
limited the availability of such information to physicians treating Medicaid patients for fear of FCA liabil-
ity, those Medicaid patients would be much less likely to receive possibly life-saving oﬀ-label prescriptions.
Although, as noted above, many states’ Medicaid programs provide discretion for coverage of oﬀ-label, non-
compendium uses, drug manufacturers might choose not to involve themselves with Medicaid physicians at
all rather than risk promotion in one of the states that does not allow such discretion. And, while there is a
narrow exception in the Medicaid statute that allows for payment for certain drugs that are not otherwise
covered where the drugs have been determined to be “essential to the health of the beneﬁciaries,” drug
manufacturers might again choose to err on the side of caution.380
Medigap, Medicare+Choice, and Medicare Part D plans (under the Medicare Prescription Drug Beneﬁt that
will go into eﬀect in 2006) are or will be administered through contracts between private insurers and the
Secretary of HHS which provide for risk sharing arrangements with the federal government.381 As discussed
in greater detail in Part II, all of these plans provide for some form of government reinsurance payments
of prescription drug costs paid by the plan or enrollee.382 Because all of these plans potentially implicate
379Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,076.
38042 U.S.C. §1396r-8(a)(3).
381Prescription Drug Coverage for Medicare Beneﬁciaries at 7, http://www.kﬀ.org.
382Id. at 3, http://www.kﬀ.org.
65the public treasury, improperly submitted claims for reimbursement under any of them might be found to
constitute a basis for FCA liability in the same manner as improperly submitted Medicaid reimbursement
claims in Franklin v. Parke-Davis. Thus, while a decision in Franklin would be limited on its facts to
claims submitted for Medicaid reimbursement, the reasoning of the case might be extended to any or all
of Medigap, Medicare+Choice, and Medicare Part D plans. Pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking to limit
their potential FCA liability might therefore exhibit similar caution in dealing with physicians treating any
Medicare beneﬁciaries following a decision upholding liability in Franklin v. Parke-Davis.
In contrast, however, private insurance companies’ prescription drug coverage is largely determined by their
formularies.383 In ﬁfteen states, private insurers must allow beneﬁciaries access to non-formulary drugs if (1)
they are medically necessary, (2) they are prescribed by a physician, and (3) the preferred drug is ineﬀective
or reasonably expected to cause an adverse or harmful reaction.384 Fifteen states also require coverage of
non-formulary drugs when scientiﬁc results reported in the medical literature support the oﬀ-label use of
a drug for a medical condition, and “an additional 15 states speciﬁcally require[d] oﬀ-label coverage for
the treatment of cancer.”385 Thus, privately insured individuals may automatically have greater access to
oﬀ-label prescriptions than do Medicaid beneﬁciaries by virtue of state law.
Furthermore, the potential chilling eﬀects of Franklin v. Parke-Davis on drug manufacturers’ willingness to
promote oﬀ-label uses to Medicaid physicians would not extend to physicians who treated privately insured
individuals because such promotion could not give rise to FCA liability. While the logic of Franklin might be
extended, as discussed above, to Medigap, Medicare+Choice, or Medicare Part D claims, claims submitted
for reimbursement by private insurers cannot provide the basis for FCA liability because they do not involve
383How do M+C Plans Manage Pharmacy Beneﬁts? Implications for Medicare Reform at 12, http://www.kﬀ.org.
384Description and Analysis of the VA National Formulary, supra note 236, at 153.
385Id.
66claims presented for payment to the federal government.386 Promotion of oﬀ-label uses to physicians treating
privately insured individuals might potentially be actionable by the FDA under the FD&C Act, but would
not lead to the false claims necessary to trigger the FCA’s application. Thus, while drug manufacturers
might curb their promotion of oﬀ-label uses to Medicaid physicians (and even to Medicare physicians) in an
eﬀort to stem their FCA liability, they would not have to do the same with regards to physicians treating the
privately insured. Again, given the fact that oﬀ-label prescriptions are most often written in oncology and
pediatrics, a decision upholding manufacturer liability in Franklin v. Parke-Davis could have a signiﬁcant
impact on Medicaid beneﬁciaries’ access to cutting-edge medical treatment.
Manufacturer Willingness to Disseminate Information
In addition to the potential concentrated impact on Medicaid populations, a decision holding the manufac-
turer liable in Franklin v. Parke-Davis might aﬀect the larger patient population as well. A manufacturer
that fears incurring FCA liability based on disseminated information on oﬀ-label uses might choose to limit
the information it makes available to physicians. As discussed above, a manufacturer might only restrict
information available to Medicaid physicians because false claims, and hence FCA liability, can only arise
from Medicaid (and perhaps Medicare) claims. However, an extremely cautious or risk-averse manufacturer
might reduce or altogether eliminate its disseminations of information on oﬀ-label uses to all physicians,
not just to those treating Medicaid or Medicare patients. Clearly a manufacturer cannot be held liable for
any improperly submitted Medicaid claims if it has not disseminated information on the oﬀ-label use for
which the prescription is written because it has not played any role in the chain of causation that led to
38631 U.S.C. §3729(a).
67the improper submission. Thus, the manufacturer could not be shown to have “caused-to-be-presented” the
false claim for payment, as required for FCA liability.387
This approach would have a drastic eﬀect on physicians’ ability to provide optimal medical care to patients
given the fact that disseminations of information by drug manufacturers via enduring materials and CME
seminars provide a great deal of the necessary information available to physicians on oﬀ-label uses.388 With-
out information on the eﬀectiveness of oﬀ-label uses, physicians would not be able to prescribe drugs for
cutting-edge uses, and the impact would likely be most severely felt in the areas of oncology and pediatrics.
Manufacturers may, however, hesitate to restrict their disseminations in such a severe manner because oﬀ-
label uses represent such a high proportion of overall drug sales – estimates state that between 25 and 65% of
all prescriptions written are for an oﬀ-label use.389 If physicians did not receive information on the safety and
eﬃcacy oﬀ-label uses, they would be much less likely to prescribe drugs for such uses, and the overall sales of
drugs for oﬀ-label uses would drop accordingly. Thus, drug manufacturers seeking to maintain their current
sales levels would most likely balance the risks of FCA liability based on disseminations of information on
oﬀ-label uses against the beneﬁts of sales that result from such disseminations.
This calculus would most likely lead drug manufacturers to attempt to limit disseminations of such infor-
mation only to physicians treating Medicaid (and possibly Medicare) patients, as FCA liability cannot arise
from oﬀ-label prescriptions written for privately insured individuals. Such a distinction, however, could be
extremely diﬃcult to implement in practice. Thus, if manufacturers found themselves unable to diﬀerentiate
between physicians along these lines, they could opt to err on the side of caution by reducing or eliminating
their disseminations of information on oﬀ-label uses to all physicians, with resulting deleterious eﬀects on
physicians’ ability to provide optimal medical care to patients.
38731 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1).
388Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,076.
389Blackwell & Beck, supra note 5, at 440 (citing Shane M. Ward, WLF and the Two-Click Rule: The First Amendment
Iniquity of the Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Oﬀ-Label Drug Use Information on the Internet, 56 Food &
Drug L.J. 41, 45-46 (2001)).
68Clash Between FCA Liability and the First Amendment
Franklin v. Parke-Davis also raises an interesting policy question about the role that the First Amendment
should play as a defense to an action under the FCA. As discussed above, a plaintiﬀ’s ability to show
that a manufacturer is liable under the FCA for promotion of oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs that results in
improperly submitted claims for Medicaid reimbursement will turn signiﬁcantly on the facts of the particular
case. However, if a plaintiﬀ is able to make the requisite showings to establish FCA liability, the manufacturer-
defendant may in turn seek to assert a defense based on the First Amendment, claiming that its promotional
activities constitute protected speech. In response, the plaintiﬀ could attempt to rebut this defense by
distinguishing between the manufacturer’s promotional activities themselves and the intent behind those
promotional activities. The manufacturer’s FCA liability would stem from the actions it took to promote
its drug for oﬀ-label uses “knowing” that the use was not properly reimbursable under Medicaid; FCA
liability would not inhere to manufacturer promotional activities absent a showing of the requisite levels of
scienter and direction of submission of claims. 390 Thus, the plaintiﬀ might concede that the manufacturer’s
promotion was protected insofar as it was not aimed at causing the submission of false claims, but argue that
promotion accompanied by the requisite intent for FCA liability falls outside the scope of First Amendment
protection. The court faced with the burden of deciding the case would thus have to balance the competing
policies behind the FCA and the First Amendment in determining whether the First Amendment could
properly shield the manufacturer from FCA liability.
VI.
39031 U.S.C. §3729(b).
69Conclusion
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis represents the intersection of two threads of food and drug
law that had previously been independent – the regulation of promotion of oﬀ-labels uses of FDA-approved
drugs and the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse laws, most notably the civil False Claims Act. As
discussed in Part IV, the district court has thus far approved Franklin’s attempts to use the FCA as a means
of creating manufacturer liability for oﬀ-label promotion by rejecting both Parke-Davis’ motion to dismiss
and motion for summary judgment.391 Both decisions have, however, depended largely on the speciﬁc facts
that Franklin alleged concerning the extent of Parke-Davis’ fraudulent activity. In considering the possible
future ramiﬁcations of Franklin v. Parke-Davis, it is important to note that its value as precedent may be
limited by the emphasis the district court ultimately places on the speciﬁc facts of Franklin’s allegation in
its ﬁnal decision on the case. If the opinion turns largely on the details of those factual allegations, a future
qui tam plaintiﬀ seeking to assert Franklin v. Parke-Davis as the basis for similar manufacturer liability
may ﬁnd him/herself in a more diﬃcult position in terms of proving the requisite elements of an FCA claim.
In particular, depending on the facts of his/her individual case, a future plaintiﬀ may have diﬃculty asserting
a number of elements of an FCA claim, as discussed in Part IV. First, the plaintiﬀ may have diﬃculty proving
that the manufacturer “caused to be presented” false claims for payment by the government if s/he could
not show that the manufacturer directed the claims be submitted but only “knew” that they would be
submitted.392 Next, a plaintiﬀ may not be able to show that the claims submitted were “false or fraudulent”
within the meaning of the FCA, perhaps because the applicable state Medicaid statute provides discretion
391United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 39; United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *1.
392Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Practical Perspectives, supra note 109, at 117, n.31.
70in reimbursement for oﬀ-label, non-compendium uses.393 A plaintiﬀ may face further resistance from a court
as to whether the FCA is an appropriate tool for enforcing the oﬀ-label promotion provisions of the FD&C
Act, either because the promotion has not resulted in a false claim or because the claim has not resulted in
harm to the public treasury, and the FD&C Act does not provide a civil damages remedies for violations.
Finally, the manufacturer may seek to assert a defense based on the First Amendment, forcing the court
to determine whether the manufacturer’s promotional speech merited First Amendment protection given an
intent to “cause-to-be-submitted” false claims under the FCA.
In addition to these fact-based issues, which future plaintiﬀs will surely face in claiming manufacturer FCA
liability based on promotion of oﬀ-label uses, the legal claim involved in Franklin v. Parke-Davis raises the
interesting policy considerations discussed in Part V. In considering the extension of FCA liability in this
manner, courts should perhaps be informed by the potential disparate impact their decisions could have
on Medicaid (and even Medicare) populations as opposed to privately insured individuals. Courts faced
with future cases raising claims similar to those in Franklin v. Parke-Davis should remain cognizant of the
crucial role that manufacturer dissemination of information on oﬀ-label uses plays in ensuring that physicians
have access to the cutting-edge research needed to provide patients with optimal medical care. A thorough
evaluation of these potential impacts clearly requires much more in-depth analysis, however, it is important
to remember that cases are not decided in a vacuum and may have vast and far-reaching social consequences
in addition to their value as legal precedent.
393United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *7.
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